

# Marine Corps Gazette

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FORTY CENTS



# Marine Corps Gazette

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**Editor in Chief**

BGen S. R. Shaw

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
THIS MONTH'S COVER ..... by MSgt Bill Sutphin

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Courtesy Mount Wilson Observatory

## FROM BEYOND THE SKY TO BENEATH THE SEAS

In the field of communications, two extraordinary events have occurred within a short span of time. One was the linking of Europe to America by the submarine telephone cable. The other was the sending of radio signals from U. S. satellites in outer space.

Both achievements depended on developments from Bell Telephone System research. The cable was made

possible by the development of long-life electron tube amplifiers which are able to withstand crushing pressure on the ocean floor. The satellites derive their radio voices from transistors—products of basic research in semiconductor physics.


All of this basic research is done for the Bell System by Bell Telephone Laboratories. Here, over 3000 profes-

sional scientists and engineers explore and develop in physics, mathematics, electronics, chemistry, mechanical engineering, even biology—in every art and science which can help improve electrical communications.

Through this work at the Laboratories, the Bell System has helped make your telephone service the world's finest—and will keep it so.



**BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM**





### 3 Meals a Day

... "The publishing of LtCol W. F. Frank's "Mobility for Battalions," in the July GAZETTE was most welcome. His restatement of BG S. L. A. Marshall's ideas in Marine Corps terms is a valuable contribution. I would like to take this opportunity to recommend S. L. A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire* to any Marine leaders who may not be familiar with it.



However, I feel I must take up the lance and go jousting with LtCol Frank on one of his points with which I heartily disagree. He advocates the elimination of "hot chow" for combat troops and proposes training men to do without their 3 meals a day. This is a dangerous idea and would have most harmful effects on morale. The value of a hot meal to the fighting troops when the situation allows is well known and universally accepted as a sure fire morale builder. Any attempt to reduce the number of meals to a figure less than 3 (and the elimination of hot chow as a relief from the monotony of C rations) will result in a lowering of troop morale to a considerable degree. Three meals a day and an occasional hot meal off the line is one of the few pleasant things the combat soldier has to look forward to. Don't take it away from him.

In 1950, a contemporary of mine, a rifle platoon leader who was a great supporter of S. L. A. Marshall, came to the same conclusion regarding 3 meals a day. He installed the 2 meals a day program within his platoon and through an all-out personal salesmanship campaign tried to sell the idea to his men. He failed and in the end was thoroughly convinced that the program was unsellable.

In support of this position, let me cite the article "Merrill's Marauders" in the January 1957 issue of *Harper's Magazine*. This piece carried an account of this famous unit's campaign in Burma during WWII. Therein is vividly recounted the adverse effects on morale and a continual preoccupation with thoughts of food when troops were subjected to short rations—and bear in mind that this was an elite unit.

Capt K. R. Steele

Svc Co, MCB  
29 Palms, Calif.

### ON MESS NIGHTS

... In the March 1957 GAZETTE, Col Fraser made the point that the practice of holding formal dinners in mess, or mess nights, was by no means a foreign importation in the US Navy and Marine Corps, nor a new custom either. He is of course quite correct.

The man who really killed off the tradition — at least for some years — was the Secretary of the Navy who dried up wardroom messes throughout the Navy and who did his best to exclude sons of Marine and Navy officers from appointment to the Naval Academy: Mr. Josephus Daniels. Blood pressures still soar in the Army and

Navy Club when his name is mentioned.

Until Mr. Daniels concluded, 42 years ago, that officers weren't to be trusted to have wine or beer in the wardroom (hard liquor had long been prohibited), it was the normal practice to hold formal dinners in mess to mark almost any occasion of note — particularly the reporting or detachment of officers, by way of welcome or sendoff.

For instance, in going through some unpublished reminiscences by MajGen George Barnett, 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps, I came on the following passage which certainly supports Col Fraser's assertions:

"The night of the day (12 Dec 1897) we reported on the *San Francisco*, lying in Smyrna harbor, the wardroom officers gave us a mess dinner of welcome; the other guests of honor being the departing officers whose places we were to take. An orchestra played throughout the dinner, and afterwards, the executive officer was called upon to respond to a toast . . . There was quite a session after dinner, and Mr. Volstead was by no means present."

In other words, the mess night was a well established custom of the Naval Services 60 years ago. More power to those who are renewing it.

Col R. D. Heinl, Jr.

HQMC Washington 25, D.C.

*Ed: For the benefit of younger Marines, "Mr. Volstead" was a leading prohibitionist in Congress whose name is associated with the Prohibition Amendment and its implementing legislation.*

### THE Solution

... Capt MacMichael's new approach to Basic Training in the July issue is the solution to the basic training problem.

The hours saved by company commanders could be very well spent with their troops.

How soon can we adopt this new approach?

Capt M. P. Newton, Jr.



1st Bn, 3d Mar, 3d Mar Div  
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

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**The GAZETTE will pay \$5.00 for each letter published in Message Center**

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Jack:  
Since this ad was prepared,  
Raytheon tubes have been selected  
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Lacrosse (Martin) and Sergeant  
(Sperry Rand); Navy's Tartar  
(Bureau of Ordnance), Regulus I  
and Regulus II (Chance Vought);  
Air Force's Thor (Douglas).  
*C.W.M.*



1. Nike Ajax. Army. Ground-to-air. Prime contractor: Western Electric.
2. Sidewinder. Navy. Air-to-air. Prime contractor: Philco; General Electric.
3. Terrier. Navy. Surface-to-air. Prime contractor: Convair.
4. Bomarc. Air Force. Ground-to-air. Prime contractor: Boeing.
5. Sparrow III. Navy. Air-to-air. Prime contractor: Raytheon.
6. Talos. Navy. Surface-to-air. Prime contractor: Bendix.
7. Hawk. Army and Marine Corps. Ground-to-air. Prime contractor: Raytheon.
8. Nike Hercules. Army. Ground-to-air. Prime contractor: Western Electric.
9. Falcon. Air Force. Air-to-air. Prime contractor: Hughes Aircraft.
10. Corporal. Army. Ground-to-ground. Prime contractors: Firestone; Gilfillan.

## 10 MAJOR U. S. MISSILES RELY ON RAYTHEON TUBES

Crushing acceleration and searing heat must be endured by the electronic tubes in guided missiles. Even under these grueling conditions, tiny Raytheon tubes produce guidance impulses with steadfast reliability. This reliability is achieved through capable engineering and painstaking manufacturing and testing techniques.


The choice of Raytheon Reliable subminiature tubes for use in these 10 missiles is another example of how the 31,000 men and women of Raytheon are contributing to the nation's security.



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From Normandy to Eniwetok, P. F. C. Joseph Willie Kilroy was there... and he'll be out there somewhere when man in space is commonplace! Today, the top astroscientific and missile engineering teams in the country are already at work on the fundamental problems of space exploration and the manned orbit vehicle. One of those top teams is at Martin—with 30,000 engineering man-years of experience in missile and space system pioneering.



(Continued from page 2)



### Ki Hong Kim

. . . During the years 1950-1953, a Korean lad named Ki Hong Kim, not yet 20 years old, served in the Korean Marine Corps, and from time to time was detailed for duty with the 2d Bn, 7th Mar, 1st Mar Div.

Badly wounded on several occasions, he received not only Korean decorations but also an American Purple Heart, awarded for the serious wound he received while moving through no-man's-land to alert a Marine position that was being enveloped. Oddly enough, the Navy doctor who treated him at that time was the man called upon to perform an appendectomy for him 5 years later, in the Ohio State University Hospital.

Kim is a bright boy. After the Korean War was over, some of his friends from the 1st Mar Div brought him to the States to study chemistry at Ohio State University. But now, because of certain difficulties, he may not be able to finance the remainder of his studies. He has been employed part-time by the chemistry department as a laboratory assistant, but cannot meet all of his expenses in this manner.

Any of Kim's friends from the 7th Marines who would like to help should write to:

Professor William MacNevin  
Department of Chemistry  
417 McPherson Chemical Laboratory  
Ohio State University  
Columbus 10, Ohio

Capt W. Wiseley

Ohio State University  
Columbus, Ohio

### Problem Answered

. . . In your August issue, Sgt Dye nailed the training problem to the masthead. However, he seemed to evade the solution — 4-year enlistments.

The recruiting service can now abandon 2-year enlistments and relegate 3-year enlistments to less than 20 per cent. Let the skeptical look at the record racked up by the 8th MC-RRD in February 1958.

Maj M. F. Brumfield

600 N. Oak  
Hammond, La.

(Continued on page 6)

**MARTIN**  
BALTIMORE · DENVER · ORLANDO

(Continued from page 5)

## Develop Your Men

. . . Modern wars are so complicated they need fighters who can use their own brains. It is time to realize that in a tight spot, as in hand-to-hand combat, an illiterate former hunter, trapper, shepherd or lumberjack has more experience and is more valuable than a General.

It is up to you gentlemen to find, patronize, develop, and advertise the brains and personal initiative of your men. This is not so difficult as it seems. First, question your men and find out what kind of work a man has done, his hobbies, and how much experience he had in his work. Make this experience as valuable to the man himself as to his buddies; make him proud of it and let him show his pride to others. This is the first step in developing a man's self-



respect and personal initiative. Later on, as you become well-acquainted with your men, start a friendly psychological rivalry between the men's experiences. Win their confidence and respect, and reward the winner. This work and play will pay, because you will develop personal initiative in your men and as results you will get supermen and super-fighters.

In 1905 I was commissioned as a 19-year-old 2d Lt in the Guard Cavalry, Nicholas Officers College in Her Majesty's Crimean Moslem Horse Guard Regiment. When I reported to the Regiment I got a perfect trooper as orderly for my purebred horses, but a complete cripple for my personal orderly. Ussein Bectash was a most strange person. He had lived from early childhood with big sheep herds in the mountains. He had learned some Tartarian when he came down from the mountains. He did not understand a word in Russian and my Tartarian was not very

good. Later on, the Master Sergeant confessed to me that he and all other sergeants had been able to do nothing with Bectash. During inspections they had buried him under hay so as not to spoil the inspection of the Squadron. From the first day, I noticed that Bectash was shy but willing. He noticed that I was reluctant to get up at 0400 to ride for the Squadron drill, so he devised a trick. At 0400 he made me sit up in bed and handed me a glass of scalding hot tea in my hands; the first time I got scalded but the trick worked.

In the first 4 weeks Bectash transformed himself into a perfect cavalryman, enjoying a daring step and a snappy salute. When the Colonel of the Regiment and the 75-year-old *Mulla* came to visit me, both were astonished and asked what had I done to change Bectash into another man. In 4 months Bectash won the Merit Medal in a fight with revolutionaries and was promoted to Cpl. The idea was that I had just helped him find himself.

Boris d'Adamowitch Leliwa

Winchester, NH.

## . . . Perfect "System"

. . . This is in reply to SgtMaj C. J. Evers' letter in the Message Center, May 1958, commenting upon my article, "Privates for General Service," in the Feb 1958 issue.

SgtMaj Evers takes me to task for allegedly implying that the MOS system must go if we are ever to foster and maintain happier relationships between Marine leaders and the individuals under their command; the relationships under concern being mainly the fitting of a man to his task in a way which makes him most valuable to the Corps. Or, more exactly, guiding the right man to the right job, which is a general problem of continuous concern in every large organization today.

I do not believe that I advocated the abolishment of the MOS system, although I agree that I may have implied that. Personnel classification, with its MOS numbers, DPI, and all the rest of the facilities of modern personnel accounting, is a technique—a "system"; the concept of "general service" is a principle. The 2 are not in conflict. Indeed, they are both necessary to a great

degree in any successful phase of Corps operations.

However, one of the points I try to make in my article is that the perfect "system" is far from the answer. I'm certain that the SgtMaj has seen outfits perfectly run—by the "system"—and yet has observed that they lacked a certain something; that they just weren't first-rate.

If you feed first-rate material into



the system, you have a good chance of coming out with a first-rate outfit. Since first-rate material isn't always available, the good leader has to look behind the system. He does his real work with the apparent misfits and malcontents. He "creates" his outfit from the material at hand.

SgtMaj Evers said that the goal of personnel classification is to "discover the individual's capabilities and experiences right at the beginning of his career and capitalize on them." That's wonderful—an excellent ideal to strive for—but I simply can't believe that the system can do the "capitalizing" part of the job. There are many officers and NCOs who can, however, if given the chance. Or more exactly, if they will take the chance.

Name, age, birth-date, rifle-range scores, date last returned from overseas, PEBD, GCT score, formal education, employment history—these and other factual data are necessary and can best be handled today by machine accounting procedures.

But, attitudes and capabilities? No! That's where leadership takes over.

Capt T. K. Thomas

Shirley Ave.  
Euclid, Ohio

Marine Corps Gazette • October 1958



## *Feats of Hercules No. 5*

### **FROM THE SNOWS OF FUJIYAMA TO THE SANDS OF FLORIDA**

The Lockheed C-130 HERCULES, now in service with the United States Air Force at Ashiya Air Base, Japan, won its "go anywhere, haul anything" reputation the hard way.

In snow landing and take-off tests at Bemidji, Minnesota, the "Ski-130" HERCULES performed prodigious feats of strength and power. At 124,000 pounds gross take-off weight the ski-equipped HERCULES was airborne in 2,100 feet. Carrying the same payload it landed and stopped in only 1,200 feet.

At Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the

C-130 HERCULES (weighing 110,000 pounds) landed on sand and stopped in 947 feet. Take-offs from sand, with the same load, averaged only 1,500 feet.

This famous aerial "strongman" can carry 90% of all types of missiles now operational with, and under development for, the U.S. Armed Forces. The C-130 HERCULES is now in world-wide service, or scheduled for delivery to: USAF's Tactical Air Command, U.S. Air Forces-Europe, Pacific Air Force, Air Photo and Charting Service, other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, and the Royal Australian Air Force.




### **Lockheed means leadership**

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# LOYAL COMPETITION

## *THE LIFE-ESSENCE OF*



F ALL HUMAN POWERS OPERATING on the affairs of mankind," said Henry Clay in a speech to the Senate in 1832, "none is greater than that of competition." He spoke, of course, as an American addressing an American audience; his opinion was drawn from experience gained within the American social order. As such, it was justified; for competition was then, and continues to this day to be, the life-essence of American society. Foreign observers of the American scene have adhered with remarkable consistency to this characterization, from De Tocqueville in the early 1930's noting "with what feverish ardor the Americans pursue their own welfare and . . . the vague dread that constantly torments them lest they should not have chosen the shortest path which may lead to it," to Harold Laski remarking after WWII our "universal passion for

physical prosperity . . . the idea of the dynamic career . . . the zeal for individual accumulation."

The peculiarly American character of this competitive spirit seems to have been a product of our environment. Personal ambition, certainly, is not peculiar to Americans. The unique character of the American environment was compounded of our conditions of complete political equality and relative freedom from the social barriers of the Old World, added to the virtually unlimited opportunities afforded by the natural resources of a virgin continent. Here, as rarely before in any other land, the "career open to talent" has offered challenge and rich reward impartially. The basis of our government has been the equality of individuals before the law and at the ballot-box; the basis of our economy has been equality of opportunity. Our astounding economic progress has been powered by the release of individual energies generated by the incentives of our environment.

The military policy evolved by this free and competitive society for its protection against enemies foreign and domestic has been—in

N

# OF AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY

By George Fielding Eliot

escapably—a product of the society which evolved it.

The professional military officers who are the instruments of that policy and aid in its development are, as individuals, also products of the society they are sworn to protect.

They were born into and grew up within American families and in the competitive climate of American life. "The American," notes Gabriel A. Almond, "views himself and his family as in a state of competition with other individuals and families for success and achievement. . . . What he appears to want are the material evidences of success—money, position and the consumer-goods of the moment. While the stress is toward money, or what money can buy, the important thing is not the money itself, but the sense of accomplishment or fulfillment which it gives." No young man who has grown up in this atmosphere—whether his particular family experience has been one of success or disappointment—can lay aside the innate attitudes and urges of the competitive society by the simple act of putting on a uniform for the first time.

Of course, he can, in time, acquire

an altered set of values. His "sense of accomplishment or fulfillment" may cease to be chiefly dependent on money and become re-oriented toward goals of professional accomplishment, of worthy responsibility rather than by the size of his bank account and the sumptuousness of his house and his motor-car. The simple "well done" of a revered chief may become of greater importance to him than being elected to the board of directors of a great corporation. But if he achieves these rewards it will be because the spirit of competition still burns brightly in his heart. He may have changed his criteria of successful competition, but he cannot insulate himself from the competitive American climate.

Time was when this latter statement might have been open to challenge. Time was when the American youth who became an officer withdrew into the shadows of cloistered seclusion from the mainstream of American life and if he stayed in uniform, gradually acquired, in genteel poverty, a scornful tolerance for the individualistic material values which motivated the majority of his fellow-countrymen. He derived some



**George Fielding Eliot** is a distinguished author and lecturer. Born in New York, he was educated partly in the US and partly in Australia. From 1939 to 1947 he was military and naval correspondent for the NY Herald Tribune. He was military analyst for the Columbia Broadcasting Company from 1939 to 1946 and for the Mutual Broadcasting System from 1950 to 1952. He lectures at the US Naval War College, National War College, Command & General Staff College and the Canadian National Defence College.

sardonic satisfaction from the knowledge that only his self-sacrifice, and that of others who wore his cloth, stood between those values and the challenge of potential foes. Meanwhile he did his duty, little regarded by those he protected save when challenge became so blatant as to force itself on the popular attention, and forgotten again thereafter as soon as he had dealt with the danger thus presented. His incentives—save in actual war—were of necessity drawn from within himself, from his own inner reservoirs of pride, of loyalty and of dedication, for his advancement in his profession depended not on individual merit but on the slow ascent of the seniority ladder; it came to the sloth and the laggard and to the faithful and diligent officer in equal measure. His competition was not for his material progress, but for his own self-respect and the esteem of his professional associates.

But the days of cloistered detachment have gone forever. The changing international climate has at last compelled the American people to maintain in time of peace (or at least in the absence of immediate armed conflict) substantial military forces both active and reserve, widely scattered throughout the nation, visibly present in every state and large community, and absorbing the bulk of the public revenues for their support.

In 1908—just 50 years ago—there were less than 7,000 active commissioned officers in our armed forces. Today more than 300,000 commissioned officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force are on active duty.

The military profession now forms a major segment of American professional life. It compares favorably in numbers with other learned professions; thus the census of 1950 shows that there are 192,000 physicians and

surgeons, 170,000 lawyers, 167,000 clergymen in the United States. The professional officers of the services and their families no longer live almost wholly in government quarters on army posts and naval stations; many of their homes are in the midst of civilian communities. The posts and stations themselves cover far more ground than they used to, and are of far greater importance to the affairs of the adjacent civilian communities and have much closer contact with them. Children of military families are growing up amidst all the hurly-burly of our competitive society and are acquiring its values as they look forward to its rewards. It is still possible for the officer to keep his own "sense of accomplishment or fulfillment" oriented toward the goals of his profession, but he is far more conscious than formerly of the criteria of civilian success and of the material rewards which fulfillment of those criteria bring.

Moreover, his chosen profession is no longer without value in the civilian market place. It requires of him a degree of technical preparation and consistent progress beyond the imagination of the officer of only 50 years ago. The weaponry and military equipment of today are among the principal products of American industry, and the talents which design, develop, operate and maintain them are identical in many respects with those required to produce them. Contacts between the personnel of the armed forces and of arms-producing industry grow closer as the complexity of weapons increases. The material rewards of civilian competition are no longer beyond the reach of the accomplished military officer even at the later stages of his career. His experience has a marketable value rather than being, as it used to be, a handicap to civilian employment. The civilians with

whom he is thrown into contact in the performance of his duty are for the most part men who have gone far beyond him in the drive toward material rewards. Their families live more luxuriously. Their children have better educational prospects.

What influence, then, keeps so many able officers in uniform?

Loyalty, for one. Loyalty to a country which is faced with its most terrible threat—a threat which could not be countered without accomplished professional officers. Loyalty to his service, which has been bred into him by training and by association with others likewise motivated. Loyalty to persons—to chiefs whom he has served and who have in their turn extended loyalty to him, to subordinates who look to him for guidance and support.

But loyalty alone is not a sufficient explanation. For the American officer, the "sense of accomplishment or fulfillment" is still necessary, and the drive behind it is the inbred American spirit of competition. In foresighted—perhaps instinctive—recognition of this fact, the officer's career today has been made more "a career open to talent" than it used to be. Advancement in grade, and the recognition which goes with it, is far more dependent than formerly upon individual effort and merit. Promotion by selection, with merit as the touchstone, and elimination of those not selected for advancement, is now the rule. This process gives greater scope and offers greater reward to the competitive spirit. In so doing, our modern military policy follows the norms of the competitive society which it serves, a society which depends for its motive power—as already remarked—on incentives which result in the voluntary output of individual energies. The result has been the production, especially in the higher echelons of the military hierarchy, of an officer corps of superb professional qualities—as the character of the leadership of our forces in WWII and the Korean war most emphatically attests when compared with that available in some of the earlier wars of our history.

Indeed the American officer of today finds himself living, from the day he first dons a uniform, in a segment of society no less motivated by

the competitive spirit than any other; though with its own criteria of "accomplishment or fulfillment." Upon the extent to which he can adjust his value-orientation to these new criteria, depends his future value to his service; for if he cannot make this adjustment he will either leave the service at the earliest opportunity, or remain in it through sheer inertia, a prey to frustration and discontent, or become a positive threat to its integrity. The officer who reaches the heights of professional repute is he who makes the goals of the military profession his own and who seeks to attain them with a competitive vigor no less intense, though channeled and governed by a deepening sense of loyalty and of dedication, than that displayed by civilians of comparable energies.

Competition, let us repeat, is the life-essence of American society; and within that society, the life-essence of the American military profession is *loyal* competition—dedicated competition if you like.

Without the spiritual quality of loyalty, there would be nothing to distinguish the military profession from many others — no distant star save that of self-advancement; yet in the military profession the final answers are written not in ink on balance sheets, but in blood on battlefields where men offer up their lives that their country may live.

Without the practical spur of competition, there would be no assurance that the upper levels of military responsibility would be reached by the best, the most vigorous, the most capable leaders: there would be no certainty that the American military profession could stay the course, could keep up with the fierce and furious pace of twentieth century technology, could match, in that race of life and death, the ultimate competition of the enemy.

The spirit of loyal competition within the officer corps of our military establishment is nourished, however, by deeper roots than those of mere personal ambition. The resolve to excel, "the wish to be first" which Emerson asserts to be implanted in every child of our race, takes many forms in American military life. In all our military services there are competitions between units at every level of organization, cover-

ing many aspects of military efficiency from battle-readiness to neat housekeeping. With athletic competition the fledgling officer becomes acquainted very early in his career, and when he comes to wear eagles (if he ever does) he will find himself still excited not only over the annual Army-Navy classic, but about the baseball team of his post or his ship's raceboat crew. By that time he will know a great deal about the relation between all kinds of unit competitions and the quality of the unit as a fighting team, and about the relation between the quality of unit and the career of its commander. But by that time, also, if his record is such that it gives him reasonable prospects of one day exchanging his

spent in actual command of units, or even in duty which brings him into daily contact with such commands, such as staff assignments at unit headquarters. The diversity of modern life, the widening responsibilities of military policy in the spectrum of national policy as a whole, the continuing peril arising from the implacable hostility of the communist powers, the complexity of weapons and of the industrial processes of weapons procurement, have combined to diversify the tasks which must be performed or participated in by military officers. Duty in the Pentagon or on joint or inter-allied staffs at home and overseas; with Military Assistance Groups in foreign lands; with civilian and specialized agencies, reserve components, schools and training centers; technical assignments in research, development and test activities, and administrative duties of great variety are among the tasks which the modern officer must face during his career.

The key development which in a single generation has brought about this great diversification and broadening of the functions of the military officer has been the slowly dawning concept "of national security as a function that encompasses the responsibilities of both military and non-military agencies, and that thereby converts the military into partners in an enterprise greater than their own." Under the influence of this concept, which largely stems from the experience of WWII as developed in the cold-war period that followed—and especially in the rise of the United States as the principal member of a series of military alliances—the old traditional functions of the military officer have been modified in two ways: "First, officers have become increasingly concerned with international affairs, that is to say, with the premises of military policy, with the purposes for which and the terms on which military forces will be deployed. They have moved upstream toward the fountain springs of national policy. Second, their support functions—supply, finance, research and development, public relations, manpower management and the like—have grown more numerous, difficult and important. They have moved downstream toward the point where



eagles for stars, it will give evidence that he has applied much more time and effort to the twin ends of doing a good job for his superiors (and his country) and taking good care of his subordinates than he has to polishing apples. If he has imbibed so deeply at the fount of loyalty that loyalty "up and down" has become his second nature his record will show it, his chiefs will know it and so will every last man of any command he has held. In establishing such a record, an officer may be said to be competing with his peers for prizes which only a few may hope to win; but if he competes in the spirit of loyalty up and down, as the services understand that term, success will not be begrimed him.

Not all, nor even most of such an officer's period of service will, however, under present conditions, be

the river widens into a bay far broader than any they have ever traveled before."

There is danger in this—danger that the old professional values will begin to fray at the edges, that new motivations will make their appearance: motivations wholly consistent with the mores of the competitive society as a whole, but foreign to the spirit of loyal competition which distinguishes the military segment of that society. There can be no escaping the fact that military officers today must participate in many decisions and much policy-planning in which there is great civilian interest, not merely from the viewpoint of national security, but from economic and party-politics angles. To the extent that officers permit themselves to acquire motivations originating in non-military contentions, much less to take sides or allow themselves to be made use of by the parties thereto, they impair the security of the nation—a security which depends now more than ever upon a corps of officers imbued with the military ideals of loyalty and dedication.

Moreover they set an example which will not pass unnoticed by junior officers. In these days of the nuclear-jet-electronic technological revolution, tremendously increased responsibilities will lie upon the shoulders of comparatively junior leaders, should the dread day of battle ever come. The public mind is beclouded and confused by the size and potential violence of modern weaponry; but—as BGen S. L. A. Marshall puts it in the August, 1957, issue of *Army*—"unless man functions superbly under any and all conditions of war as it is now envisaged, all our highly destructive means and all our new methods will be useless." No duty of senior officers today is so exigent as that of developing the junior leaders who must meet the terrible demands of the nuclear battlefield—or, being visibly ready to do so, prevent that battlefield from ever becoming reality. It is not only senior officers actually exercising command upon whom this responsibility rests: all who wear the insignia of the higher grades have a part in this task by the force of the example which they set.

So far, that example has been not

only sound but on the whole inspiring. Few indeed have been those who have sullied the bright escutcheon. Considering the pressures from without, considering the temptations offered and the ingenious sophistries with which they have been coated, the record is little short of miraculous. It bears high testimony to the quality of the ideals in which our professional officers have been reared, and to the fidelity with which those ideals have been adhered to. In the preservation of these ideals, the spirit of loyal competition has been the cement which has held together the foundations upon which our edi-

loyalty thus inculcated—the highest altar in the temple—is loyalty to country. But the symbolism and the spirit of that loyalty is expressed—translated to the individual's consciousness—through the channel of devotion to his service, of pride in its past glories and confidence in a future no less glorious.

No officer would be worth very much, either to his service or to his country, who did not believe with all his heart in the value of his service, in the vital importance of its contribution to the national security. Military history contains many instances when regiments have vied with each



fice of military organization rests, and at the same time the source of the energy which has built the edifice stone by stone from its earliest beginnings. Perhaps it would be better to say that the ingredient of loyalty has been the cement, the ingredient of competition the source of energy. The more challenging the problems to be solved, the greater the energy that must be applied to their solution.

Now the energy which is generated by the competitive spirit has its well-springs deep in our history; it is our American heritage, our way of accomplishing our ends. The well-springs of the loyalty with which that energy is tempered in the military profession lie deep in our history also, and their flow is kept fresh and sparkling for each generation of fledgling officers by the seniors who teach and train them in the traditions, the duties and the pride of the particular service whose uniform they wear. In each case the final

other to see which should be the first to plant its colors on the hostile ramparts—to the extent that men have given their lives to win the honor. So do our armed services—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force—contend with each other, each claiming the place of pride, each inspired by "the wish to be first" in the defense of the nation which all serve. Translated into the complexities of military policy and the tortuous paths of weapons production and development, the assignment (and the definition) of roles and missions, the allotment of funds in the annual budgets, this inter-service emulation creates considerable noise, not to say heat. Civilian observers—even those with enough administrative or Congressional experience to know better—are often inclined to think that inter-service competition is a bad thing, that there ought to be more centralized authority, more decision-making at the top.

Few would deny that national de-

fense is now big business, and that the Department of Defense is the largest organized enterprise in our economy. But it is an American enterprise, operated and directed by Americans who react to American incentives; the neat little rectangular blocks on its innumerable organizational charts each represent one or more American human beings. This is a truth which must ever be kept in mind in juggling with the little blocks.

In an able paper on military research and development prepared for the Rand Corporation, Charles Hitch remarks: "As a nation we are presumably committed to free competitive enterprise. Anyone who proposed that we eliminate competition and duplication in research in, for example, the American chemical industry by central planning, coordination and knocking heads together would be denounced as either a socialist or a promoter of cartels. But whenever we think we have reason to be dissatisfied with military R & D we criticize it for precisely those features which it has in common with R & D in the competitive economy. Instead of taking the best practices in our more progressive industries as a guide for the military services, we plump for a highly centralized bureaucracy."

The fact is that, for Americans at least, competition is the best way to produce energy, and duplication—another bad word—is often the quickest means to a chosen end. In the civilian economy, he who works hardest and gets his product on the market first may reap financial reward. In the military field, the reward to be reaped for being first may well be national survival—with a correspondingly drastic penalty for being second.

This does not mean that military competition at any level—including inter-service competition in weapons

development or any other field—should be entirely uncontrolled and uncoordinated. It does mean that it should not be suppressed, that it is a vital force which should be kept alive, encouraged within reasonable limits, made use of to the maximum degree consistent with sound over-all control by the Government of its military forces.

In the paper just cited, the author observes: "No ingenious expert in the field of management has ever devised a half-way effective substitute within government for the incentives of a competitive economy—the carrot and stick incentives associated with competitive firms risking their own money and subjected to the test of impersonal markets." That is true to a degree—nevertheless inter-service competition, and the competition *within* each service of individuals and subordinate agencies provides at least a partial substitute. Yet almost all proposals for "improving" our military establishment, as Mr. Hitch observes, "are aimed at strengthening central planning and coordination, adding new layers of authority, and getting rid of what little desirable duplication and competition we have left. They would create neat, dead, bureaucratic monopolies."

As Professor John D. Millett of Columbia University, co-author of the Hoover Commission task force on departmental management asks, "Why should we seek a monolithic administrative structure in a political society whose very strength is in its diversity, its varied and competing centers of power?"

This is indeed not the American way of doing things.

Least of all should we venture to introduce such a system into the military establishment, upon which the very survival of our society as a whole may depend: not only because it is foreign to our political practices, but because it cannot be oper-

ated by American officers in the spirit of loyal competition which is the governing characteristic of the American military profession.

The true basis of our civil-military relations, as Professor S. J. Huntington points out, lies in maintaining a just equilibrium between the civil and military powers, one which shall maximize objective civilian control on the one hand, and military professionalism on the other. On the military side, the spirit of loyal competition is vital to such an equilibrium.

If it is over-controlled, denied expression and accomplishment at successive levels of the military hierarchy, it will atrophy—or solidify into a shape which will be something other than American.

Somehow our political leaders—and those who set them in high office—must come to understand that in our military profession as in others, it is the competitive spirit which generates energy and produces progress: and to understand likewise the need for preserving the restraints of loyalty and dedication which temper the spirit of competition and guide it toward the military ideal of selfless service to the State—keeping these restraints alive by tending with reverent hands the well-springs of their origins.

Only by understanding and accepting the fact that the military institutions of the United States, like her political, social and economic institutions, must have an American character and be worthy of the confidence of Americans, can this nation continue to enjoy security in a troubled world. In this way alone can we possess, now and for the future, a military establishment which, in the words of our first President, shall continue to "appear truly respectable in the Eyes of our Friends and formidable to those who would otherwise become our enemies."

US MC

### Testing . . .

THE SUCCULENCE (?) OF C RATION HASH was tested one moonless night in Korea, while I was occupying a listening post (temporarily) with another Marine. Hearing a faint rattle from the concertina strung across our front—where pebble-filled cans served as signals of intrusion—my companion immediately dug into his parka pocket. "We'll find out who's down there," he whispered hoarsely. Cocking his arm, he let fly with what I thought was a grenade. When no explosion came, I asked if he'd pulled the pin. "Pulled the pin, hell; that was a can of hash. If it comes back, we'll know there's some commies down there!"

T Sgt W. A. Daum



THE PROTECTIVE INSTINCT, OR SELF PRESERVATION, is one of the strongest inherent traits of all living things. The manifestations of this instinct in nature are many and varied. The porcupine has a fearsome array of quills to discourage would-be attackers. The turtle has an armor-plated skin into which he can withdraw and sit out unpleasant circumstances. The opossum uses psychology; when confronted with a difficult situation he rolls over and plays dead. The skunk, of course, has a more indirect though equally effective protective mechanism.

These creatures, however, are pikers at developing protective devices when compared to some of our more imaginative Marine Corps administrators. Under the guise of controlling correspondence, they forge a bewildering array of shackles which provide them almost 100 per cent protection in the paperwork jungle.

Unfortunately, this protection, while valuable to the individual, is not without cost to the Marine Corps in terms of delays, extra man-hours (and in some cases extra personnel), extra office supplies, extra office equipment, and extra office space. These, as we are gradually learning, mean extra dollars.

Just what are these protective devices and how can one recognize them? Essentially, they are, in the order of waste involved: logs, duplication of files, excessive review of outgoing documents, receipting for un-

# STRIKE OFF THOSE ADMINISTRATIVE SHACKLES!

By Lt Col. F. C. Bacon

classified documents, and date-time stamping of incoming documents.

Logs come in many forms. There are logs of incoming messages, logs of outgoing messages, logs of incoming unclassified correspondence, logs of outgoing unclassified correspondence, *et al.* What is even worse, they are frequently kept at all echelons in a headquarters, so that one document may be logged-in as many as 3, 4, or even more logs in one headquarters. Usually the information recorded in the log includes: from; to; date; subject; date received, routed to; replied to (date); reply signed by; file location; etc.

Most such logs are a complete and inexcusable waste and serve no useful purpose, particularly when they duplicate other control procedures—as often happens.

The best source of the information contained in such logs are the documents (incoming) or the official file copy of documents (outgoing) themselves. These documents or official file copies can be obtained as readily from an efficient filing system as the information regarding the documents can be located in the appropriate log.

Control of important mail may be necessary in some organizations especially where replying to correspondence is not emphasized as an action desk responsibility. However, even in these organizations, there are better ways of effecting this control than through logs; e. g., preparation of an additional copy of the routing

sheet for retention in a tickler file. This, of course, will be limited to that small portion of the mail (less than 15 per cent) which should receive a routing sheet.

Logs are usually recommended only in controlling classified material where the volume of such material is too small to warrant a card control system (less than 20 classified documents per day).

At one large headquarters, action officers became concerned because it frequently took from 2 to 3 days for mail to get from the mail room to the action desk. A survey revealed that the delay was caused by the mail "control" procedures which created a king-sized bottleneck at the logging clerk's desk. After a rather large struggle, the log was abolished along with other unnecessary controls; the net result being that mail began reaching action desks within 2 to 3 hours from the time it arrived in the mail room. Also, none of the dire predictions of lost mail or late replies materialized.

Another large organization has even gone so far as to abolish the use of routing slips with no ill effects.

Duplication of files results when inefficient filing procedures cause unacceptable delays in finding required documents in official files. Then, to keep the "Old Man" happy, intermediate administrators start, or expand, their own files. Action offices and even interested offices start pulling off copies for their own "desk files." These bootleg files need extra

copies and extra filing cabinets which cost extra dollars.

The worst feature of this practice ensues when incoming documents are retained in these bootleg files rather than being sent to the official files. Naturally, this causes even more problems for the official files personnel when they try to find these documents for other staff agencies; or, as occasionally happens, for the very office which holds the document in its own files.

The ill effects of duplicate filing can be avoided only by a vigorous and continuing records management program. Official files must maintain a high rate of efficiency and duplicate files must be uprooted at an early stage in their development. All requests for filing cabinets should be cause for a close look at the requesting agencies' records holdings.

Excessive review of outgoing documents creates delays and dissipates administrative and executive effort without an accompanying increase in perfection. This is a particularly expensive procedure when smooth drafts rather than rough drafts are used to gain the required concurrences and/or approval.

One review of the smooth draft by a competent individual for typographical accuracy and proper format, enclosures and assembly should be adequate for any but the most important documents. All necessary reviews of the content of the document should have been accomplished in



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rough draft form and should have been limited to the action office, any offices having a functional interest in the contents, and the individual who will sign the document.

In one organization as much as 50 per cent of available typing time was being spent on retying smooth drafts. Frequently, a smooth draft was retyped for no other reason than that one individual reviewing the document did not agree with the originator's or another reviewer's choice of words which adequately expressed the idea being communicated.

This situation was overcome by requiring that only one rough draft be routed through to the approving office. Each individual reviewing this document was then required to use a different colored pencil in making any corrections or comments. Thus, it was quickly determined who was "nit picking" and who was making worthwhile contributions.

Receipting is a particularly nefarious practice when applied to other than classified material. When applied to unclassified mail, it indicates that something is basically wrong with the administrative machinery of the organization, and what is even worse, a lack of trust and confidence.

Receipting may be accomplished by requiring a signature in a log, on a routing sheet, on a copy of the document, or on a specially prepared form. In either case, it should be quickly abolished.

Date-time stamping is another unnecessary and expensive practice of some of our more gadget-happy and inspired administrators. They are not content upon receiving a document, no matter how trivial, until they have imprinted on the back thereof a neat design showing the date and time it was placed under the stamp. This, in most cases, is their badge of office and they wear

it with pride.

It is not unusual to find as many as a half-dozen of these imprints on the back of a very routine and unimportant document that does not even require a reply.

Only documents such as Congressional mail, contracts, invoices, and the like should be date-time stamped and then only at one point in an organization.

While these are not all the protective devices, they are the major ones which signal poor administrative practices. They are easily recognized. However, responding to these signals by doing something about them is another matter. The administrator will defend them with violent protestations and predictions of the worst sort of consequences befalling the administrative machinery of the organization should they be eliminated.

Whoever would assault these fortresses must first equip himself with a detailed knowledge of sound administrative practices (NAVEXOS P-1209, A Guide to Simplified Mail Operations, is a good start).

He must prove to the administrator that he knows as much about the administrative practices and correspondence procedures under examination as does the individual in charge of them before he can gain a willing acceptance of the changes. This takes time and patience; frequently more than one is able, or cares, to expend in this area; which, of course, is the principal reason that such expensive practices continue to exist.

More important than eliminating these practices is the need to improve the climate which nourishes their growth. All too often such practices are invented after an administrator has been subjected to some abuse when he could not immediately lay his hands on a desired

document. Even though the preferred solution would be to improve his administrative practices, he will develop a new control mechanism to ward off future unpleasantries.

We should all be more appreciative of the big job that the administrator does for us. We should recognize that any unusual demands made upon him or his staff will normally interfere with the routine he has established to provide us the best possible service.

What is even more important, we should realize that our instructions to them should be more explicit. In their efforts to do a good job, they will usually give undue importance or urgency to a routine need stated in non-routine terms.

We are all familiar with the situation where the "Old Man" says he would like to see some document. He doesn't express any time requirement, but each time this request passes down the chain of command a few more degrees of urgency are cranked into it. As usually happens everybody drops what they are doing to help find the document. Then after the whole office routine has been completely disrupted and the document has been delivered to the "Old Man," he asks that it be held until the next morning. Had he stated this in the first place, the request could have been satisfactorily handled without disrupting the entire office.

We should therefore develop a greater appreciation of the impact of our comments and instructions to our administrative personnel. Be specific. If we really need the document immediately, we should say so; but at the same time we should be prepared for a delay in other administrative work. If there is no need for haste, we should say so at the time we make our request, not after everything else has been dropped to respond to it.

Additionally, when that infrequent occasion arises that the administrative machinery cannot produce the desired result to an exacting degree, we should not be too quick in criticising. One hundred per cent perfection is seldom attainable in even the most precisely engineered machine; in an administrative mechanism, it is too expensive to even contemplate. US MC

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
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Marine Corps Gazette • October 1951



■ A COMPANY OF RECONNAISSANCE Marines recently were heli-lifted from submarine to shore in an experiment of a new technique of amphibious warfare.

Taking place off the California Coast near Camp Pendleton, the demonstration was termed a success by officers of participating groups, which included the 1st Recon Bn, VMO-6, and the troop-carrying submarine, *USS Perch*.

Five Marine pilots threaded their HOK-1s onto the narrow after-deck

of the sub and shuttled the troops to the beach some 4,000 yards away until all 75 members of the recon group were ashore.

Several theories were advanced on the experiment's possible application. One situation would be for a helicopter carrier to launch its planes from a safe distance at sea. Not having to carry a pay load until they reached the sub, the 'copters would thus have increased range. Landing on the submarine deck, the helicopters would pick up troops

much closer to shore and fly them to their objective. A variation of this would be for the aircraft to refuel from the submarine, permitting an even greater distance between carrier and sub.

Another possibility would be to use heli-lifted troops as scout-swimmers. Instead of using rubber boats, which could be detected by radar, a "chopper" could drop the scouts in the surf without stopping, giving the enemy radar no indication of its true activity.





By  
Tru  
  
**Infantry Problems  
Attendant to War  
in the Far**

**NORTH**

The more difficult the terrain, the more  
valid the maxim that in any war the indispensable  
element is the infantryman



By Kurt Dittmar, Generalleutnant a. D.

Translated from the German by Capt H. W. Henzel

THERE WERE TIMES — AND THEY still lie within a memory's span — when the outcome of a war was for the most part an infantry problem. Whenever the infantry, their equipment, their training and their morale were mentioned — consciously or unconsciously — one referred to an entire people or national group. The infantry was "The People in Arms" in a true sense.

The acme of the infantry in its dominating position occurred during the latter half of the 19th Century. The cavalry — at that time no less important than the infantry — was dethroned and the limited area of the battlefield required only a relatively small concentration of artillery fire power. Even in 1914 the proportion of infantry to the overall strength of the large units amounted to almost 85 per cent.

But the zenith of its rise also marked the beginning of an unpreventable decline: each war-year of the First World War brought a numerical reduction in infantry

strength. The infantry strength requirements amounted to only 50 per cent in 1918. This shows clearly the organizational tendencies of those years.

The reasons which led to this development are known: The sacrificial slaughter of the first months of the First World War had clearly shown that infantry engaging each other by means of massed fire and movement had outplayed its role on a battlefield which was dominated by machine guns and rapid fire artillery. Only then did the consequences of the technical and scientific capabilities of the Industrial Age become obvious. Mechanized weapons permitted the extensive substitution of the fighting man by the machine. The application of modern industrial methods to the production of war materials, to produce almost unlimited quantities of guns and munitions, gave the massed fire power of the artillery an ever increasing prominence. To a certain degree it became the "basic arm." In the

overly caustic formula of the French, *L'artillerie conquiert, l'infanterie occupe*, this theoretical development reached its highest and also its turning point.

This truly exaggerated mass of artillery strength resulted only in compounding the basic error by developing another upon it. "This mass will be unwieldy, it will no longer be able to maneuver; therefore unable to conquer, it can only overwhelm." With these clipped words Gen von Seeckt marked, retrospectively, a development which had replaced the infantry mass of former times. Thus, by the acquisition of heavy weapons, any daring operation of extended scope was made impossible by the dependence upon the industrial sources of the homeland and the supply routes from there to the front. Just as in the 18th Century, the dependency on "magazines" hindered the conduct of war.

It was the armored, motor-driven combat vehicle which, in close coordination with the air force, again



**Forward movement is most difficult in such country.**

brought the emphasis of movement back to the battlefield. As a result, the classic art of maneuver was given new life in the form of thrusts conducted quickly and overwhelmingly. The old cavalry, which for decades had been almost completely pushed off the battlefield, experienced its resurrection under new circumstances.

More than that: the motor-driven Panzer itself became the "basic arm." Around it the auxiliary weapons were grouped, embodying a remarkable change—the organic attachment of infantry to Panzer units. The large infantry units were themselves, to a large extent, satellites of the new basic arm. So in the 1940 "Blitzkrieg" against the Western Allies, the campaign was decided even before the mass of the infantry divisions reached the battlefield.

Had the former Queen of Battle sunk to the level of just another supporting arm?

Speaking only in terms of numbers it would appear to be so, in view of its proportionate strength in the composition of large combat units. But even if the infantry portion amounts to hardly one quarter, there are still other arguments which negate any doubts about the decisive roll of the rifleman today.

A more or less negative proof of the fact that (in spite of all the technical developments) the last decision still rests with the infantryman lies in this analysis: Where, during a

war, does the first weakening of physical and moral strength occur? Where, in the extreme case, do the beginnings of defeat show themselves? These developments always stem from the infantry. It is they who first reach the breaking point and they who are first overcome.

Now it is possible to comprehend the ideas behind the entire weapons and organizational development during the decades since 1914. These were: to reduce the number of infantry as much as possible in order to reduce the casualties. The more mechanized weapons, the more concentrated fire power, the more armor plate employed, so could the infantry element be proportionately reduced it was reasoned.

But the question arises also, if striving for "as little infantry as possible" did not actually overshoot its mark. It is true that what was earlier the fate of the mass, today has to be imposed on relatively few. However, these few must carry an ever-increasing burden when engaged in extended combat against a strong and capable enemy. This is so because a smaller number of infantry means also that the same units must again and again go through the bloody mill of the "last 200 meters."

Perhaps it may seem a somewhat curious contradiction in our technical age that the comparatively primitive equipment and training of the rifleman still leaves him in his dominant position within the combined

weapons system. It is this which guarantees him nearly unlimited possibilities of employment—especially in those circumstances where small elements of the forward infantry first discover barriers where life and movement are extremely difficult for even the most rugged individuals. This timeless, irreplaceable characteristic of the infantryman rests more or less solely on his capability of being able to fight where any other technical or mechanical component is excluded.

Circumstances which may force the burden of the battle more or less solely upon the infantry may become exceptions. At times, these may be hindrances which cannot impart any lasting influence on organization or conduct of battle. It is different with the influences which the terrain, or to a greater degree the theater of war, may impose. Modern technical development has also changed much in this respect; above all, the control of the air space has brought to an end the inaccessibility of certain areas on the face of the earth. However, everything which is earthbound in such an untrafficable or impassable area encounters considerable difficulties.

It is obvious that in such country a conduct of war primarily based on continued movement and mobility of the forward lines encounters great difficulty. It is always instructive when a critic of the stature of Liddell Hart observes that one of the most important reasons for the miscarriage of the German offensive against the Soviet Union in the year of 1941 was the backwardness of the Russian hinterland. This backwardness, so he says, was as effective as the considerable advance in the technical development of their weapons which the Russians unquestionably had made. A lack of good highways, secondary roads completely choked up with mud, extensive swamps, vast and impenetrable forests—all were factors in bringing the intended "Blitzkrieg" to an early end. At the same time, these natural conditions enabled the Russians to introduce their counteroffensive because these conditions caused the Germans to lose the initiative and, thereafter, they were only able to maintain their battle posture by constant maneuver against the numerically su-

perior Russians. In the subarctic terrain of the Far North, the lack of human habitation and the consequent lack of roads made the assembly and resupply of larger troop units especially difficult. Endless forests, interspersed with extensive moors, hindered every attempt to move off the few constructed roads (or even completely eliminated this possibility in the summertime when swamps would have to be crossed). A maze of lakes of all sizes created many terrain features which were easy to defend. Again and again these presented the attacker with new difficulties.

To a certain degree, one can compare war in the Far North with mountain warfare.

These areas, the mountains and the Far North, are extremely primitive topographically and in this respect both are backward, since both areas make any movement difficult. Therefore, in the subarctic regions the most important combat element is that which, like none of the others, is independent of heavy and ponderous weapons: infantry. This element must retain a certain degree of combat efficiency when the most primitive hardships are imposed upon it. Or, if—in the face of today's extensive technical advances—this is also beyond the capabilities of this army, finally its decisive and indispensable element: the rifleman.

This follows logically from the conditions of the terrain in the Far North if one establishes the fact that here, more than anywhere else, the rifleman is the basic element of battle.

In the 1941 campaign in Lappland, the German-Finnish forces were operating against the Murmansk railroad. During this operation it was readily apparent that every step forward could be made only where the strong Russian positions could be threatened by extensive marches around their flanks and rear. Only in exceptional cases was our own superior artillery able to engage effectively in the battle. Repeatedly, the greater part of it, as well as a majority of the heavy weapons of the infantry, hardly fired a shot. The antitank elements were only able to execute their assigned missions during a few days of the battle; more often these troops were



*Mountain troops are specially trained for such conditions*

employed as riflemen.

Accordingly, this showed that the high losses in each of the battles were carried—to an overwhelming degree—by the rifle companies. Almost every time it was necessary to commit the last reserve rifle company. The bloody losses alone did not decimate the infantrymen. The survivors were exhausted after the days' and even weeks' long marches through the trackless forest and had almost reached the limits of their physical and moral strength. Therefore it was seldom possible to exploit completely the success achieved; the time which had to be taken to rest and refresh the riflemen was used by the enemy to good advantage. Decisive victories which perhaps, or even probably, would have been easy to achieve during the exploitation phase had to be delayed because no fresh infantry troops were available.


Now for the tactical picture. In this campaign barely 6 German and Finnish divisions attacked 7 Soviet divisions in addition to powerful naval elements and border troops in an area whose terrain was best suited for defense. From an operational point of view it was important that at least a local and temporary superiority of the offensive forces be achieved. That this had to happen as quickly and with as great a degree of surprise as possible was obvious, otherwise the Russians would have had ample time to take countermeasures. The importance of such a thrust was strategically even more

pronounced since in the Murmansk railroad the Russians controlled an efficient line of communication which had no comparable equivalent on the German side.

But such a concentration of forces for an offensive effort never occurred. It was not that the German command was not aware of, nor did not realize, the necessity of this. However, in the higher echelons they were thinking in terms of "divisions" and not in terms of "infantry," as the tactical requirements of the northern theater of war demanded. To assign additional divisions was, of course, impossible because none of the established rear area supply systems was in a position to adequately support more than 2, and at the most, 3 divisions. But in this case the fact was overlooked that a full strength division was not required in order to concentrate an effective offensive mass—only additional infantry.

Of course, to achieve such an addition of infantry only, would require a difficult decision by creating what in the German army of earlier times was called a "dismembered unit." But here it should have been done because the organization of the units was not in keeping with the requirements of the theater of war. Here the ballast had to be separated from the payload if success was to be achieved. This realization came too late.

Another mental obstacle was also to have its effect: An incontestable



*Artillery is not always necessary — nor even desirable*

rule which stemmed from the bloody days of 1914, where the impetuous desire to attack was more than once responsible for the infantry attacking alone in the early battles before the artillery could become effective. These experiences resulted in the ironclad rule that through a co-ordination of both arms, a fixed measure of fire superiority had to be achieved. And now was this basic maxim to be abandoned? There was always more artillery available than needed, and often more than could profitably be used. Nevertheless, this concept of combined arms prevailed. Such a concept was not primarily oriented to the point of view of the infantry, or the corresponding peculiarities of the theater of war. A tactical principle which under normal conditions would be completely justified, in this case became a great hindrance.

In 1941 a satisfactory answer was found to the question of effective support for the infantry in the forest lands of the Far North, at least under certain weather conditions. Even in the first battle, the seizure of Salla, German bombers were very effectively integrated into the ground attack. In the battle of envelopment east of Kairala, support from the air prevented the annihilation of the German enveloping group equipped only with light weapons and fighting far beyond the range of its own artillery. The independence of air power from the normal supply routes to the front and its capability to join rapidly in conjunction with ground forces, facilitates an overpowering concentration for the at-

tack. This capability made airpower the most effective arm next to the infantry—even if its dependence on the weather did limit its employment and the resupply of the ground troops. But an ever-present air force for the Germans during the Lappland campaign was only an illusion.

The desire for "more infantry" in 1941 never found its fulfillment. Also the obvious necessity for a "better infantry" could be taken care of first only through our own improvisations during the course of the war years.

The connotation "better" requires clarification. It was not a case of there being any indication that the will to fight and the morale of the infantry did not satisfy great demands placed upon it (even if their training could only meet the vicissitude of the northern theater of war with limitations). A rapid analysis showed that most of the men who made up the German units and their replacements came from urban-professional sources. They could not compare to the Finnish raftsmen, woodcutters and woodsmen who had grown up in such a landscape and were familiar with it. These differences gradually began to disappear in the course of time and with regulated training and acclimatization to the area. "Better" in this sense refers to weapons, equipment and organization.

The normal infantry division—equipped with horse drawn vehicles, lacking any special equipment—was insufficient to cope with the problems of war under unusual cir-

cumstances of terrain and weather. Now we must try to satisfy this wish for "better" infantry by implementation at the organization level.

From the standpoint of flexibility, the regimental group—with a powerful infantry unit as a core, around which the necessary artillery and pioneers are grouped—will form the starting point for the formation of the operational ground unit to replace the overstrength "normal" division. What one chooses to call it—a battle group or a brigade—is of secondary importance. What is important is that this unit has characteristics which do not require that it be reorganized to fit every case. It should have a minimum strength of at least 5,000, but not over 6,000 men.

Within this organization, the infantry would have to be given the dominant position, not 50 per cent as in the normal infantry division, but up to  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the total strength. The arrangement of these infantry elements must be such that would permit the battle to be conducted so a part of the infantry combat strength could always be held in reserve. The minimum requirement within the brigade would be 4 battalions rather than 3 battalions of the old regimental organization.

If the strength of each battalion were set at about 1,000 men, that would give a total of 4,000 men which could serve as an infantry striking force.

About 2,000 would remain for those units which would be immediately subordinate to the brigade: the headquarters troops including a reconnaissance and a security unit, each in the strength of a squadron; an artillery detachment of at least 3 batteries with pieces capable of the greatest possible range, of about 100 mm caliber; an antiaircraft battery; a pioneer company and as many service troops which a limited independent supply system would require. As far as tanks are concerned, a battery of 9 to 12 assault guns would be sufficient.

With about a thousand men, the strength of the battalion would be sufficient to assure a high degree of self-sustained combat efficiency. Another consideration: battalions are now responsible for what was for-

merly regimental responsibility: the development of a base of fire by the employment of the heavy infantry weapons. If these weapons are assigned to the battalions, it parallels the organization which German mountain units have always used and has proven to be sound. Their battalions were organized and equipped with respect to the nature of the mountain terrain which required the battalion to be the basic self sufficient combat element.

In this case the triangular organization should be abandoned. Four rifle companies instead of the normal 3—even with the mountain troops—can very considerably increase the stamina of the battalion. Primarily it is most important that the basic tactical principle be developed to a point where only a severe crisis would require the simultaneous commitment of all 4 rifle companies.

Also, the quadrangular organization should be extended down to the rifle companies where the fourth platoons could also serve as carrying parties. This expedient has already proven itself during the great battles of the First World War.

The rifle platoons would carry only such weapons as could easily be carried by one man alone: sub-machine guns, automatic rifles and above all hand-carried high trajectory weapons and rifle grenades (which at the same time could be used as hand grenades). Each of the commanders of the rifle companies would have organic, a heavy weapons platoon with three 50 mm mortars and several bazookas, which would enable him to reinforce his fires on any position he desired.

We have established that the battalion is the basic combat element under conditions in the Far North. Therefore, in this respect sufficient weapons must be available for the formation of a concentrated base of fire in the attack—and as required in the defense—without creating an oversaturation of supporting fires. Consequently, the minimum and the maximum limits dare not lay too far apart. The heavy weapons company, to which these heavy weapons should be assigned, should contain six 80 mm mortars and two or, better yet, three 75 mm mountain guns, transportable on carts or



**Rifle platoons carry only such weapons as the man himself can bear**

pack animals. These latter pieces could be replaced by a recoilless gun of the same caliber (individual weight should not exceed 55 lbs.).

A headquarters company would be made up of a non-tactical administrative unit, a pioneer platoon, a signal platoon and a heavy machine gun platoon for antiaircraft defense.

If the proposed brigade contains a small proportion of organic artillery and no tanks, few assault guns and only a small quantity of antitank weapons, it does not imply that these weapons are not necessary. This would be a very hazardous assumption for the war in the Far North. So much is certain, however, that such heavy supporting arms are not necessary in all cases, and in no case so consistently that they should always be incorporated in the basic tables or organization for a unit.

A place for these weapons, however, should be sought at a higher level which is still close enough to be able to cope with suddenly arising emergencies. At the same time they should be far enough removed from the local scene of combat, so as to be effectively employed in a certain area where their commitment would be based on an overall operational point of view as well as from the tactical point of view.

This echelon should be the army corps to which countless assignments will fall after the elimination of the divisions. It logically follows that an army corps under conditions of the Far North must be more than a mere command echelon. It should

contain organically (only from situation to situation) those elements which have been eliminated from the brigades to give them more flexibility. The same must also apply to the tactical air force.

Not so easily answered is the question as to how the request for "more infantry" by echelons above brigade could be justified. Here one will have to point out the natural assumption that all other weapons will be at the disposal of units, to serve as reinforcements (over and above the basic operational elements) on the battlefield. The infantry is the only arm which does not have such attached units. This is reasonable, since all attached units should lessen the burden on the infantry so as to help it forward, by giving it additional firepower or supporting it in defense.

But to repeat: Deploying additional infantry in depth is justified for no other reason than to relieve forward units, and thereby prolong the life span of the most overburdened element.

If one is trying to extract the organizational formula from this, he can arrive at general as well as specific solutions for war in the Far North: that several battalions, identical in structure as the subordinate battalions of the brigades, should be organic to an army corps. Such additional infantry would be assigned to brigades engaged in the main effort for limited assignments on a temporary basis or for a specific mission. Thus, they would serve as gen-



The Finnish boat sled proved most valuable for weapons and supplies

eral relief for the infantry. Such a solution would not be anything basically new. Even in the First World War the assault battalions employed by each of the German field armies operated more or less in the same manner, in spite of the fact that they were more specialized troops because of their equipment, training and their especially high esprit de corps.

What is most important is the *tactical mobility* — the ability to bring men and weapons to bear against the enemy through the difficult terrain which is a normal condition in the Far North. This is much harder to achieve because strategic mobility can always be achieved by using the motor truck or air transport or, in certain instances, the railroad to overcome the vast space of the northern terrain. The preparation and execution of tactical movements will be especially difficult considering the scarcity of highways and road nets or the lack of suitable landing strips in the subarctic; most of the time they would have to end far in rear of the front. This would often necessitate employing special types of transportation (for example, tracked vehicles or animal trains) in order to follow the advancing troops as closely as possible from the unloading point.

But the greatest difficulties will begin where the infantry, with all its various battalion weapons, finally has to leave the reindeer paths in order to deploy for combat. This is the moment which will decide whether weapons and equipment measure up to the sudden transition from motorized movement to primitive forced marches and combat, lasting perhaps for days and weeks, over trackless forest and swamplands.

Infantry of the old type, the bulk of which moved on foot and whose weapons and equipment was moved along on horse-drawn vehicles, would find it easier to displace than motorized infantry if such were used in the Far North today. Pack animals and horses for sleds or carts could seldom be carried along on the long motor marches because of lack of transportation space; usually they had to follow in slow shuttle-movements or in time consuming marches on foot. Consequently, an effective connection between the fighting troops and their trains was often missing. Such shortcomings promote the tendency of motorized troops to become road-bound.

What is important to solve the infantry problem of combat under far northern conditions (with regard to effectiveness) is the constant availability of equipment which enables the unimpeded transition from the route march to the approach march to deployment for battle in uninhabited areas.

Naturally everything has to be done to shorten the distance between the terminus of the road-bound motor vehicles and the fighting front for the transport of weapons and supplies. The best means for this purpose is a tracked vehicle to pull carts in the summer and sleds in the winter. A vehicle similar to the type tractor used in farming and logging operations can be used to great advantage. Their inclusion in the tables of equipment for all units, not only for the infantry, is a positive necessity.

One should be careful not to expect *too much* of such vehicles, however. Stretches of swamp in the summer, high snow drifts in the winter, vast boulder outcroppings

in both seasons of the year, can often limit their usefulness very unexpectedly. What remains, as the ultimate means, is the packing and carrying ability of the human being—nothing else. This condition will exist until pack animals and mule trains (or cart trains in the summer and reindeer or dogsleds trains in the winter) can be obtained.

This brings us to the requirement for light carts and sleds, suitable for man-powered trains. These carts and sleds must have the capacity to carry almost all of the weapons represented in the brigade except artillery, which can be carried along without too much difficulty if it is broken down for the march cross-country.

Carts of this type, with the least possible weight and easy maneuverability, can not be improvised and must be readied along with the summer equipment for every unit which anticipates assignment in the Far North. Interchangeability to one-horse harness for small horses must be possible. In the winter, during certain snow conditions, a corresponding number of light sleds designed to be used by men as well as animals, take their place.

These light sleds are distinctly different from the heavier, horse-drawn sleds or the tractor drawn sleds with a capacity of 1,000 lbs. which can be used very well in the rear on narrow snow roads that have to be cleared beforehand.

The light Finnish boat sled (*Akja*) with its light weight and capacity of almost 100 lbs. proved to be of great value in Lapland. It can easily be pulled by 3 men (relieved at regular intervals) on skis or snow shoes, or one buck reindeer for long movements.

Many attempts were made to employ motor sleds. In terrain which was broken by boulder fields, they proved of little value. This was also the case on the vast ice stretches of the large lakes. Their loud motor noises can make their employment difficult or even impossible when in contact with the enemy.

A very helpful mode of transportation in the most difficult time for movement, the thaw period, is the Finnish summer sled (*Purila*). This is a drag improvised from trees in



**The "summer sled" is essential for movement off the main supply routes**

which a horse is harnessed between two sapling trunks which have been lashed together over the drag. Above all, this is also very well suited for the transport of wounded.

What is most important for the tactical mobility of troops in the far northern forest lands, however, will always be whether or not they are trained in the use of skis. For this, a previous knowledge of skiing does not necessarily mean that they also can *fight* on skis. The latter will always remain as the goal for a complete state of training and readiness. But a sufficient degree of proficiency can only be acquired by having grown up in such an environment or to have a knowledge of skiing through sports in order to be the equal of the Finns.

It should not be forgotten that a very useful piece of equipment is the snow shoe. For a unit which has not acclimatized to winter warfare, snow shoes will not offer a speedy form of movement, but they will nevertheless provide a satisfactory degree of winter mobility. This is of great assistance.

Another basic necessity for winter war is that clothing has to be available that is suitable for terrain and climate, protection against cold as well as for camouflage. The lack of shelter must be compensated for by tentage which serves that purpose, such as that which the Finns had. Efforts to duplicate the skill of the Finns in building snow houses quickly will also prove valuable. "Primus" stoves are very practical but should not be regarded as a reason for neglecting to train troops in building campfires under difficult conditions. It is important that all

weapons be manufactured so as to ensure their positive functioning even in extremes of cold.

All in all, comparatively simple requirements in organization and equipment must be fulfilled in order to prepare a unit for combat in the Far North. Perhaps the real difficulty is in the field of qualified personnel. More than anywhere else (where a set battle can be planned with co-ordinated, concentrated fire-power) combat in forests leaves everything up to the inherent combat efficiency of the individual. Therefore, certain natural instincts, which men who come from a big-city environment have lost, must be systematically revived and sharpened. Sense of direction; the ability to locate oneself in a landscape which lacks any outstanding terrain features; reading of tracks; a "sixth" sense which perceives the enemy even before the action is joined—all this must be acquired through training and environment before a unit has achieved a state of readiness for combat in the primitive northern forest.

It is not too much to say that combat in the northern forest lands and the preparation which precedes it is, or at least can be, a finishing school for infantry.

A unit which can cope with the peculiar difficulties of this type of terrain and which is not spoiled by an overabundance of mechanical means, will fight even more effectively under less arduous conditions. The German mountain troops proved themselves always to be an elite unit even outside of the realm of mountain warfare for which they

were especially prepared and trained. It should not require a detailed analysis to find similar characteristics in the combat record of the US Marine Corps, even if in this case, as in the former, unusual and unforeseen conditions had to be met.

One can see the general outline which an analysis of the requirements of combat in the Far North brings forth and perhaps also in another sense, of the infantry problem as we have called it, which presents itself there with especial intensity. But will it be acute there only? We doubt it! In the beginning we have tried to show how the pendulum has swung toward a lesser mass of infantry since 1914. This was the case because of the pressing demands to reduce to a minimum the great number of infantry casualties. But in the course of this evolution the shoulders which in most cases always had to carry the greatest load, became smaller and smaller. So perhaps the time has come to examine the question and see if the pendulum should not swing back in the other direction, that is in the sense of not only a "stronger" infantry, but an infantry which is no longer condemned to become "the weakest link of the chain" in the course of long and heavy battles.

It may be that such observations in today's era of atomic weapons would seem to be old fashioned. However, no one can say with assurance whether or not we have reached an equilibrium in the realm of nuclear warfare. The natural consequence of such a stalemate can only be a complete return to conventional weapons if mutual annihilation is to be prevented. USMC



# THE NEW LOOK IN DRILL

By Maj D. V. McCloskey



ONE OF OUR TRADITIONS IS THAT Marines drill a little bit better than anyone else. Drill has always served us well as one of the primary means for developing the leadership and command presence of junior officers and NCOs. Through drill, the fundamentals of discipline, the life-blood of a military organization, are firmly implanted in Marines. Today, drill is more important than ever because of reliance which must be placed upon small unit discipline and leadership, in an assault by vertical envelopment.

Marine Corps activities have been engaged in implementing a "new look" in drill. Throughout these activities Marines are discussing this "new look" with the same fervor displayed by fashion experts over the merits of the "sack." Under fire in this new drill are the basic changes it has fashioned in drill techniques.

This "new look," as contained in the Marine Corps Drill Manual, is an elaborate extension and modification of drills previously set forth in the Landing Party Manual and Eight-Man Squad Drill Regulations. It is composed of 2 separate and distinct categories of drill, executed by formations comparable in strength to FMF rifle squads and platoons. One category of the drill is executed at close interval (4") and close distance (23"). It consists of moving fire teams, squads, and platoons, as units through a series of intricate steps and facings. The other form of drill is accomplished by individuals in formations executing simple facings while marching at normal interval (30") and normal distance (40").

It is the close interval movements which are causing drill masters the most concern. An insight into the nature of their concern and some of the problems posed by the "new

look" was recently gained at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island. Under controlled conditions a drill questionnaire was administered to 156 drill instructors and 34 officers assigned to training recruits. A set of questions was composed comparing the close and normal interval drills and their efficacy in achieving the objectives of recruit drill periods.

The majority of DIs and officers felt that normal interval drill was much more effective than close interval drill in achieving the overall objectives of recruit drill instruction. Almost 75 per cent of this group believed that close interval drill required too much training time and individual attention for the results obtained. As to these results, 88.9 per cent stated that recruits were not sufficiently proficient in close interval drill to enable them to accomplish its movements with a unit other than their recruit platoons. Sixty per cent of the DIs and officers felt that the new Marines, upon completion of their training, did not know the movements and commands of close interval drill.

Finally, 71.1 per cent of the group stated that normal interval drill was more effective in instilling discipline within recruits. Somewhat more ominous than this finding was the opinion of more than half of the DIs and officers that the drill objective of developing, "habits of precision and automatic response to orders," i.e. discipline, was *not* being satisfactorily achieved in present instruction. From their answers to questions concerning discipline it is clear that, to some degree, instruction in close interval drill is obstructing the development of this omnipotent military characteristic in our basic Marines.

To verify results indicated on this Parris Island questionnaire, an impartial spot check was run on 29 recruit platoons in their last week of training. Instructors from DI School questioned 427 recruits from these 29 platoons, concerning their knowledge of the movements involved in the basic close interval drill command, "Squads, Right." From their assigned positions within squads the recruits were required to demonstrate their movements "By-the-numbers." Only one-third of the 427 recruits could demonstrate their movement correctly!

Under the present recruit training syllabus, 100 hours are devoted to drill. This formal training time is augmented by many extra hours of drill instruction accomplished by DIs after normal working hours. On the average, DIs spend more than half of the 100 scheduled drill hours on close interval drill. Despite this extended period, the results being achieved in this drill, as evidenced by the opinions of DIs and officers and the spot check of 29 recruit platoons, can not be termed more than marginally satisfactory.

If we project problems experienced with the new drill during recruit training to other commands within the Marine Corps, the proficiency of these Marines in the drill must be less than satisfactory. How many training hours can be devoted to drill in an infantry battalion or typical post and station activity? Only a small fraction of the time spent on drill during recruit training. It is doubtful if these organizations can provide time to adequately train senior NCOs in the intricacies of the "new look," let alone time for junior NCOs and privates to learn its movements and benefit from its execution.



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Advocates of the new drill have claimed that Landing Party Manual drill was too simple, that it lacked variety, and that it did not develop discipline and leadership in Marines. Yet, considering the opinions of DIs and officers most concerned with instilling these qualities in our future Marines, the realization of them is being hindered rather than fostered by the "new look."

What, then, is wrong with the "new look"? It is just too complex for Marines to learn within the training time which can be spared for drill in this military age of nuclear warfare. This basic deficiency in the "new look" limits its effectiveness in developing discipline and leadership within our Corps during a period when these traits are of prime importance.

The new drill is permeated by complexity. An example of this complexity and the results it bares, is afforded in looking at the basic close interval movement, "Squads, Right." By this command, through a mathematical arrangement of mark times, quarter steps, half steps, short steps and full steps, squads move from a column of fire teams, halted or marching, to the right or left on fixed pivot points. The movement is completed 6 counts after the command of execution.

To accomplish the movement, members of a squad excluding the squad leader, must each memorize 2 different sets of steps consisting of 6 steps. Memorization of these two 6-step sets is not inordinately complex. But this is the *minimum* requirement for executing the movement. It would only suffice if every Marine was assured that no matter where or when he fell out for drill he would always occupy the same position within the same fire team of a squad. This is an impossibility unless each Marine is assigned a fire team position as he is issued a service number and this position is made as

inviolate as his service number. True proficiency in "Squads, Right," demands that each member of the squad memorize 12 different sets of steps for a grand total of 72 steps.

Complexity is not limited to the close interval drill. Consider the number of supplementary commands necessary to build and diminish a platoon front, consisting of 3 squads, in the new normal interval drill. Under Landing Party Manual drill only 23 such commands are required to diminish the platoon from a column of 3's to a column of 2's to a column of files and to rebuild in the same sequence — 85 supplementary commands are required to accomplish the same movements with the "new look."

To hope that Marines will master these complex movements is unrealistic. They are not given the training time, they do not possess the interest, nor, in many instances, the learning ability to assimilate such movements. For example, our men know that on the sixth count of "Squads, Right," they must end up in a new direction alined in width and depth with other members of the squad. Instead of learning the intricate steps of this movement, they scramble through the 6 counts in a series of mark times and obliques, arranged in what they feel is a good imitation of the correct movement. Employing this gimmick they can phase into any position within a squad without undue complications. Since their leaders must be more concerned with unit, rather than individual, execution of this command the average Marine can slide through it without fear of reprimand.

Accomplishing drill in this manner contradicts its basic purposes. There is almost a complete absence of the proper mental conditioning necessary for creating discipline. With concentration upon unit execution of commands and the time

lags existing between commands of execution and completion of the movements (Up to 12 counts for "Squads, Right About"), the "new look" de-emphasizes individual drill proficiency, discipline, military bearing, carriage of rifles and "snap."

Nor are leadership and command presence developed in the "new look." These traits are matured in the confidence gained in applying a knowledge of drill in giving commands during drill periods. It is one thing to know the words of a command, but it is quite a different, and more important, thing to actually know the movement the command inspires. Few of our NCOs and junior officers know the new drill today. They do not know it for the same reasons that their privates do not know it. Unfortunately, with the "new look," we must pass over drill as the primary means for developing leadership and command presence among our NCOs and junior officers.

From this discussion of the major problems posed by the "new look" it is clear that the time has come for another evaluation of our drill techniques. This evaluation should produce a drill which is composed of simple movements, which can be effectively executed in the training time available for drill in FMF units, and one which fosters discipline and develops leadership and command presence.

Solution of these problems lies in our success with previous drill techniques. During WWII and Korea our discipline and leadership were of the highest standard. We know that the real test of the effectiveness of any military technique comes on the battlefield. It would seem axiomatic that the technique of drill which played such an important part in producing these high standards of discipline and leadership on the battlefield would have more than served the needs of peacetime training. The deficiencies found in the "new look" can only be eliminated if such a technique of drill as is found in the Landing Party Manual is adopted as our *only* form of drill. Vigorous execution of such a drill will produce Marines characterized by their high degree of discipline and leadership and who can really execute close order drill a little bit better than anyone else. USMC





**THE MAN BEHIND THE GREASEGUN** . . . The exploits of the fliers and aircraft that are keeping our nation secure can not be written without proper credit to the unheralded man behind the greasegun. He is a member of a maintenance crew . . . a crew chief . . . a plane captain who is content to enjoy the reflected glory of his ship. Something of him flies with every aircraft, and when ship and crew return safely he knows his job has been well done. For he knows that nothing could fly, no pilot could climb aboard without his contribution. Kaman Aircraft recognizes the job these men are doing and gives them a tangible salute by designing helicopters which require minimum maintenance and make the man behind the greasegun whistle while he works.

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# ENLISTED RANK STRUCTURE

## NEW GRADE AND DESIGNATION



ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO NEW ranks in pay grades E-8 and E-9 is a major feature of the new enlisted rank structure announced by Headquarters Marine Corps.


Three enlisted ranks—master gunnery sergeant, gunnery sergeant and lance corporal—will be added to the Marine Corps' enlisted rank structure.

The new enlisted rank structure insures that no Marine will lose stripes. This is accomplished by establishing "acting" ranks, thus all Marines will be able to retain their present titles, insignia and privileges. They will assume new rank titles upon promotion.

The following rank titles will be used in each pay grade: E-9 sergeant major, master gunnery sergeant; E-8 first sergeant, master sergeant; E-7 gunnery sergeant, acting master sergeant; E-6 staff sergeant, acting gunnery sergeant; E-5 sergeant, acting staff sergeant; E-4 corporal, acting sergeant; E-3 lance corporal, acting corporal; E-2 private first class and E-1 private.

Three stripes and 4 rockers with a star in the center will designate all sergeants major while the same num-

# STRUCTURE



ber of stripes and rockers with a bursting bomb in the center will indicate a master gunnery sergeant. First sergeants will continue to wear 3 stripes with a diamond in the center while their counterpart, the master sergeant, will wear crossed rifles in the center of his stripes.

Present master sergeants (E-7) will continue to wear 6 chevrons and will be called acting master sergeant. The gunnery sergeant (E-7) chevron consists of 3 stripes and 2 rockers with crossed rifles in the center.

The rank of technical sergeant, which is now the E-6 pay grade, will be eliminated from the rank structure. The title of staff sergeant will be moved up to the E-6 pay grade and will be indicated by 3 stripes and one rocker with crossed rifles in the center. Marines now holding the rank of technical sergeant will be designated acting gunnery sergeants and will continue to wear 5 stripes until promoted.

The title of sergeant will move from the fourth to the fifth pay grade. The new rank insignia will be 3 stripes with crossed rifles. Personnel currently holding the rank of staff sergeant will continue to wear 4

stripes and carry the title of acting staff sergeant until promoted.


Corporal stripes with crossed rifles will hereafter signify the fourth pay grade. All Marines now holding the rank of sergeant in the fourth pay grade will be designated acting sergeants until promoted.

The rank of lance corporal will be introduced in the third pay grade. The insignia for this rank will be one stripe with crossed rifles below the stripe. Corporals, now in pay grade 3, will be designated acting corporals and will continue to wear 2 stripes until promoted to the next higher pay grade.

The E-2 rank of private first class and the E-1 rank of private will remain unchanged.

The new 9-pay-grade structure will enable the Corps to strengthen its enlisted rank structure by adding to the prestige of all its non-commissioned officer ranks, and by providing for additional levels of supervision.

Actual conversion to the new rank structure will be delayed until suitable rank insignia are available in the supply system.





The Marine Corps Association sword was presented to the honor graduate of 1-58 Basic Class, 2d Lt Martin J. Dahliquist.

Lt Dahliquist served as an enlisted man in the Navy for two and one half years. He was awarded an NROTC scholarship to the University of New Mexico where he received a degree in Business Administration.

He has been assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade for duty.

Kaman Aircraft Corporation has now put an electrically powered 'copter into flight.

The craft's piston engine was replaced with a lightweight, high-voltage electric motor which gets its power through a cable from a gas turbine-driven generator on the ground.



The firm developed the aircraft under contract with the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics as a potential long-duration platform and is now conducting evaluation tests.

Night vision for the infantryman has been improved with a new device which uses reflected starlight, or light from skyglow, falling upon the objective.



Developed by the Army and RCA, the device is known as the "Cascaded Photosensitive Image Intensifier."

The development, differing from other night vision devices which utilize infrared or radar, intensifies the diffused light and requires no source of artificial light or radiation.

It is being used on an improved version of the "Sniperscope" which weighs less and has greater range and longer life than earlier models. The instrument is now adaptable to a wide variety of infantry weapons from .30 cal. rifles to 106 mm recoilless rifles.

Guiding the *Nautilus* on its history-making, transpolar trip were several unique navigation aids which kept the atomic-powered submarine on course under the ice pack.

Among these devices, developed by the Sperry Gyroscope Company, was an automatic depth and course keeping control which can be compared roughly to the automatic pilot used on aircraft and used to make ultra-fine adjustments in steering direction. Another device was the craft's submarine celestial altitude recorder which permits celestial navigation while submerged. A third device was a compass system which gives extremely accurate information even in upper latitude explorations.

An experimental electronic earphone that makes noise to abate noise is expected to find wide use in tanks and aircraft where noise interferes with communication.

The artificial quiet is made by a miniature microphone in a special earpiece to create a second noise—just as loud, but opposite in phase. When the 2 sound waves meet in the earcup, they use up almost all their energy fighting each other, thereby greatly reducing the noise level. As a result a loud roar is muffled to a whisper.

The second annual Unit Marksman-ship Competition, which was to be held at MCS, Quantico, Va., in September, was canceled by order of the Commandant of Marine Corps because of commitments of FMF units.

It is believed that the annual event will be held as usual next year.

The Marine Corps Equipment Board is currently testing 2 types of vehicle covers to determine whether they will maintain vehicles and other equipment in a "ready for use" condition.



Type A, forward in picture, is constructed of neoprene-coated nylon, opened and closed by means of tongue and groove rubber clamps on 3 sides, the remaining side being hinged with these same rubber clamps.

Type B, rear in picture, same construction as Type A, has a thin coat of aluminum hypalon paint on the outside, designed to provide protection against ultra-violet rays of the sun.

# TO BE SURE... USE THE RAILROADS!




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




# **SECURITY:**

## ***Handmaiden to Success***

By Maj Jack K. Knocke




• SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF MASS destruction weapons into modern warfare has forced the adoption of separated unit tactics, the success of separate or isolated units in avoiding annihilation by a surprise counterattack in force, or penetration by armor, will depend to a critical degree upon the quality and accuracy of intelligence, and as always, upon the skill and reaction time of the troops involved.

So far as assault troops are concerned, security training is practical, realistic and generally effective; the concept of being in a separated unit is not particularly upsetting to an infantryman who is aware of the actual combat power and fighting ability of a well-trained rifle company.

In the past, assault troops formed on a linear concept, rendered the rear and beach areas secure early in the campaign, and events took a reasonably slow and comfortable turn; aside from an occasional penetration, air raid, or error in target plotting, no really serious problems disrupted the relatively even tenor of these tactical zones.

With a sigh for the good old days, we must nevertheless concede that in at least the early stages of separated unit warfare there just plain isn't going to be any rear area in the conventional sense; rather, those areas charged with supporting and supplying assault elements will find that they really will have to protect themselves, adopt the ways of an infantryman as required, and retire



**Consider what one well-aimed tracer could do to this operation**

the pleasant fiction of a "secure" area to the historic past.

With the concept of separation, rear and supply areas will have to evolve an entirely different concept of position security since these elements simply do not have enough additional people available to both discharge their primary duty and provide a large standing force in readiness to repel possible attack. Combat units have no troops to spare for rear area security; obviously, service troops will have to provide, somehow, the regular support to the assault troops and still accomplish their own position security. Consider the inviting nature of rear area targets, missile storage and launching sites, fuel farms, supply dumps, ammunition storage areas; then compare the size of these areas with the numbers of personnel considered available for around-the-clock security and it is evident that a serious effort to overhaul existing

security procedures needs to be done right now.

As a starting point, it appears that all areas, forward or rear, combat or service, need not only be security conscious at all times, but also in equal degree.

The concept of continuous security leads naturally to the conclusion that everybody must take security as his personal responsibility, all officers and NCOs, all troops of the Task Force, until it becomes as routine as carrying a weapon.

To examine the possibilities, let's use an illustrative problem using as an aggressor force only one man, Ivan.

Ivan is well-trained in individual operations, is equipped with a US uniform and rifle, 3 days' rations and reasonable presence of mind. In no hurry, Ivan is willing to wait or hide out for a day, maybe 2 days, after an action has bypassed his location, and after things settle a bit is



**Maj Knocke** enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1942 and was commissioned in January of 1944. He is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin and has served as: Regt'l Survey Officer, 12th Marines; CO, Fox Btry, 12 Marines; S-3, 2d Bn, 12 Marines; ExecO, 1st Bn, 10th Marines; ExecO, 4th Bn, 10th Marines. At the present time he is the Marine Corps Representative, US Army Chemical Corps School, Fort McClellan, Ala.

ready to do his job.

Ivan is concerned with 2 general targets, electronics equipment and missiles. The selection of these targets is no accident since Ivan wants to inflict maximum damage with a minimum of effort. Using our present system of position security, Ivan has the odds with him in several respects. First, he is reasonably certain that no one will question his presence in a rear or service area, provided he attracts little attention; second, he is keenly aware that only near or at areas of high priority or of a sensitive nature can vigilant security be expected; third, if he cannot locate sensitive areas visually or by isolated security precautions, heavily camouflaged (from the air, of course) installations will help him because they will be conspicuous by the very fact that they alone are camouflaged.

Accordingly, Ivan locates his target not so much through the lack of effort of the unit itself, but rather by the betrayal of the unit by its neighbors, and with little expenditure of effort on his part.

At night, lights and generator noises will assist in giving Ivan the help he needs. Ivan now withdraws unobtrusively, locates an area from which he can observe the installation, makes his choice of target, waits for dusk and cranks off a few tracers.

If, for the sake of argument, Ivan is 300 yards from his target, it is doubtful that he will be apprehended after the act. He doesn't have to be a particularly good rifle shot if his target is carefully selected and if it is conceded that he gets a break or two along the way.

Consider what one well-directed tracer or special incendiary round will accomplish when fired into a radio relay station, radar control panel, liquid oxygen or methyl alcohol storage tank, fuel tank farm, or missile guidance equipment, or, not beyond the realm of possibility, a Redstone, fueled, ready, but not yet launched.

At 300 yards even in poor light a target 20 yards by 2 yards is hard to miss. After firing his 3 or 4 rounds, Ivan cannot arbitrarily be written off as expendable; in the resultant confusion of an exploding missile or flaming fuel tanker it is doubtful that he will be appre-

hended. Fantastic, yes; unfortunately also, quite possible.

The illustration cited is admittedly an isolated example, but no particularly unreasonable breaks have accrued to Ivan that could not be expected to fall logically to his credit. What then is to be done to protect field installations from one-man forays, or from small groups of raiders bypassed by our assault forces?

First, the widespread practice of security during darkness only, must go out the window. Security must be carefully planned and rigidly executed during daytime and nighttime alike; maximum practicable security measures become mandatory. This will mean a decided lowering of living standards in service and support areas; off duty personnel, extra drivers, whoever is available in the strictest sense of the word will have to be employed in a coordinated cohesive security program. The axiom that constant vigilance is the price of security is never more applicable than on the ill-defined battleground of tomorrow.

Second, security exercised and demonstrated by a motor repair section must be indistinguishable from that exercised by an atomic weapons field dump or missile guidance station. Critical or sensitive installations cannot continue to be pinpointed by what amounts to isolated examples of security consciousness.

Third, security measures currently the vogue on local levels in the use of radio and telephone circuits must be critically analyzed and a rigid non-committal system instituted and enforced. Use of code words such as "blast," "fireball," etc., fool nobody and are a distinct menace to the security of an operation as well as to the unit transmitting the message; a radio direction finder neatly pin-points the message origin. Radio security dealing with nuclear methods, impending strikes, etc., must be either secure to a much greater degree or couched in plain non-committal code words and sent in the clear.

With large rear areas to be controlled, radio will be heavily used, for all that, if wire is used at all, it must be treated with the same respect that a radio circuit will require.

Fourth, sightseeing, unnecessary

visits by casual observers, supply "scrounging" runs, visits to old buddies, anything that contributes to rear area congestion must be reduced to a more manageable level.

Unfortunately, the biggest offenders are officers and NCOs, or people travelling on a variety of runs with approval or encouragement of officers and NCOs. These are the same people that will have to forego their private expeditions and, in addition, rigidly control extra-curricular meandering.

Widespread, "hardnosed" control of rear area tourists will prevent Ivan from utilizing their presence as a protective cloak of anonymity.

Last, training in the actual execution of security techniques must be incorporated as an integral part of service troops' training, with emphasis upon considering security as a routine everyday requirement, part and parcel of accomplishing the mission.

Like any problem facing the military there are several solutions; those requiring complex techniques and equipment generally produce better results, from the standpoint of accuracy, than a less complex system which sacrifices accuracy in the interest of simplicity and ease of understanding. Following is a description of a security plan, one of many attempted in various circumstances,

which combines simplicity with accuracy without an excessive training requirement, and which is applicable to units having in existing T/As a moderate amount of common equipment.

The applicability is perhaps best in rear or service and support areas, supporting arms, and depending upon circumstances such as length of stay, etc., may be considered applicable to infantry units in temporary perimeters.

The plan depends upon locating all installations in the system relative to a common direction and common point, without regard to actual geographic direction or position. Like a surveyor's use of assumed azimuth and coordinates, distances are true and installations accurately located relative to one another.

To be realistic, a security system must be uncomplicated enough to permit any Marine to participate with a minimum of personal effort, once the security NCO posts his people. The men actually in position are pretty much on their own; therefore, it must be just as possible for the man in the foxhole. Viewed from the eyes of this man, the system provides an automatic direction finder, totally ignores geographic direction, and under certain circumstances renders estimation of distance immaterial. Except for the



**Communications discipline — essential**

sake of additional information, it is unnecessary for a Pfc in a foxhole to refer to a disturbance as "near the motor pool" or similar descriptive phrases which may or may not turn out to be accurate.

A simple but effective system utilizes the clock method of establishing direction, the principal desired direction of observation always being 12 o'clock regardless of geographic azimuth. Each outpost, when originally posted, is directed to observe in the desired direction. Once established, this direction is marked *on the ground* by 2 small pegs, or some other field expedient.

Once established, the observer can refer to a direction as "3 o'clock," etc., by using the pegs as a guide, or if by necessity, feeling for them. For this reason they are located on the forward parapet of the foxhole. If adjacent outposts are mutually supporting for observation purposes, as long as more than one outpost iden-

tifies the same disturbance by individual direction estimate, estimates relative to distance on the part of either or both outposts are immaterial even if both grossly err, since extending the 2 directional rays at the security plot will produce an intersection and consequently the location of the disturbance. As each outpost is established, the security NCO physically establishes the principal direction of observation and also records the *azimuth* of this line of sight, using an ordinary compass.

Back at the security CP, the Security Officer makes the usual security sketch, except that the installations are located relative to the CP and all installations are plotted as right or left of any desired reference line (designated by azimuth) which passes through the CP location, and up or down from a line normal to the reference line and also passing through the CP.

Thus, the CP is arbitrarily located

at the intersection of 2 lines, the top of the page is always the azimuth reference line, and it is easy to mimeograph a supply of forms with the lines already established in the interest of speed and ease of completion. Recording the azimuth reference line and coordinates of the CP on the sketch is required.

A handy scale for general field use is 1:10,000 as most distance estimates generally are made in multiples of 10 units. Even a poor judge of distance should be able to plot an installation within a reasonable tolerance and a significant plot error affects only that specific installation rather than producing a chain of errors. The company sketch is a priority matter and is forwarded as rapidly as possible to battalion for consolidation.

Figure (1) illustrates an idealized battery or company sketch.

At the battalion security CP a small one-man plotting central is established, located wherever desired but handy to the communications available to the unit. By using a standard chart table, plotting board, or even a homemade table, reversing a grid sheet (a large area may require two or more grid sheets), and ruling off to a scale of 1:10,000 a workable plotting central can be devised.

Attach a sheet of clear acetate to the board by taping along the top edge only, forming a curtain, thus facilitating the transfer of data.

Assign proper grid coordinates to the ruled lines, plot the reported coordinates of subordinate CPs on the grid sheet and the plot central is ready to operate.

The individual company sketches are transferred to the acetate by first throwing back the acetate and orienting the sketch on the grid sheet. This is quickly accomplished by punching a pin through the company CP on the sketch, inserting the pin, with sketch attached, into the plotted CP coordinates on the grid sheet, and rotating the sketch about the fixed pin until the azimuth reference line (top of company sketch) is pointed along the actual grid azimuth recorded on the sketch.

The sketch is now properly oriented in both direction and position; fix the sketch lightly to the grid sheet with a scrap of masking





Fig. #1



**Fig. #2**

or cellophane tape, remove the pin, turn down the acetate curtain and transfer the sketch to the acetate by using a grease pencil. To avoid confusion later, a color code system proves to be a handy means of distinguishing between the various company installations. In about an hour, an untrained Marine can develop into a competent operator, provided he has absorbed his basic map reading instruction.

Figure (2) represents an oriented company sketch. To transfer the data from the company sketch to the acetate should not require more than 2 or 3 minutes unless unusually complicated defensive systems are indicated. After all company sketches

have been transferred to the acetate, a complete picture emerges. Duplications may be eliminated and necessary coordination can be accomplished.

Thus far only part of the security problem is licked; we have all installations located to a single scale, but we still have to devise a simple, rapid, and accurate method of disseminating information pertinent to the system without resorting to the use of 8-place coordinates and engineer scales. Again the clock system is appropriate but modified to the extent of providing a means of establishing distance as well as direction.

Using a second sheet of acetate, the clock numerals are inscribed and

concentric rings drawn at whatever intervals are considered desirable. Using a scale of 1:10,000, concentric rings may be drawn at 100 or 200 yard intervals as deemed appropriate to the average size of the area involved. The clock and concentric ring diagram can be permanently drawn on this acetate since the center of the concentric ring is generally the Battalion CP (or if desired, the H&S Company CP). Each band (area between rings) is lettered with Z at the center of the smallest circle. Superimposing this second acetate diagram over the one containing the company sketch data and orienting with 12 o'clock at North, an overlay can be drawn of the entire security




Fig. #3

picture to include the clock numerals and concentric rings.

Any spot on the completed sketch can now be described both for directional reference and distance, all computed from the center of the diagram which for the sake of convenience may be the Battalion CP. For example, a location could be described as being at 10 o'clock X-RAY, or in band X-RAY at 10 o'clock.

Once all company sketches are received at battalion, no more than one hour should be required to make, ready for delivery, copies of the master sketch of installations. Now let us follow a typical type problem using a report from A Company as an example:

Outpost Number Two reports an estimated patrol, probably 5 men, at


10 o'clock, distance 100, (with reference to his clock system). A Company Security plot checks the master plan (Figure 3), translates the report into terms of the master plot, and reports to Battalion, "Probable 5-man patrol 11:30 Whiskey." (The outposts do not hear this report as it is passed to battalion via a separate circuit; the outpost is concerned only with his own clock system). All company CPs are connected via hot loop and all company security watch standers follow all reports on their boards.

In our illustration, B Company notes the activity and decides to alert his outposts, and calls his outpost number 5, informs him to keep alert for movement about one o'clock — distance 200 yards (again outpost

Bravo 5 is concerned only with his own clock). In the event of simultaneously received reports, it may be necessary at Battalion to have the Security Plot equipped with a head and chest set attached to an EE8 type telephone so an assistant can also listen and aid in locating the plots reported.

In a nutshell, the system allows the working man in the foxhole to concentrate on one directional reference. If he gets misoriented after dark, he can quickly establish direction by the pegs in the ground in front of him. Also, he is not subjected to wild guesses as to his proximity to a threat but is assured that he will be informed when he is directly concerned.

The irritating situation of having



WIRE PLAN

— HOT LOOP CONNECTING OUTPOST AND COMPANY CP

---- HOT LOOP CONNECTING COMPANY CP'S AND BATTALION SECURITY PLOT

**Fig. #4**

activity described as "down near the motor pool" by B Company, when only B Company knows the location of its motor pool, is eliminated, and is an additional dividend of the system.

Frequently, mutually supporting installations will report the same activity, rendering distance estimates immaterial since the intersection of directional reports will suffice to locate the ground position required, and a series of such reports will accurately trace the physical movement observed.

There are several variations of the system described, at least one of which employs an additional gridded overlay in order to provide more accurate plots; however, replotting is required, introducing the element of additional error, and the accuracy gained is at the expense of speed to an unacceptable degree. Since the

activity is probably moving, possibly in an undetermined direction, extreme accuracy is not as vital as is speedy warning.

The communication plan required to operate the system properly consists simply of hot loops, one each, connecting company outposts and company CP, another connecting Battalion and all company CPs. The telephone set in the company CP is not common to both loops, avoiding the possibility of a report from an outpost using his own clock system being piped directly to Battalion creating an erroneous plot. A suggested wire plan is illustrated in Figure (4).

The system described does not purport to be an original plan, rather it is the accumulation of the experiences of many persons and a combination of many other field expedients in the realm of position

security; but it is simple and it is workable, and in final analysis any security system or technique *common to all units* is better than a series of individual systems, some complementary to others and even possibly detrimental one to another.

With the accent on dispersion and consequent fluid and constantly changing battle areas, there can be no question that the vital services and support supplied by service and support units will be more critical than ever to success in war.

It is equally evident that to be able to accomplish their mission, service units and other rear area echelons will labor under conditions more severe than previously experienced, leaving no alternative but to accomplish what amounts to two jobs where heretofore rarely more than one existed.

US MC

# HOW MUCH SAFETY SHOULD

SAFETY IS A FACTOR IN AVIATION planning and operations that is receiving increasing attention at all command levels. Many decisions are made on the premise that aviation safety in peacetime is the most important consideration affecting the plan or operation. This stress on safety stems not only from humanitarian reasons but also from the definite budgetary limitation placed upon the numbers of aircraft that can be purchased, the difficulty being encountered in procuring qualified pilots, and the very long and costly period of training required for pilots and qualified maintenance personnel. What are the results of this emphasis and concentration on the safety aspects of aviation? What is the likely outcome of the safety program as it is now being carried out? To answer these questions and others which may arise, it is necessary to first examine the relationship of aviation safety to the objectives of the aviation program as a whole, and then determine what results the present methods of carrying out the safety program are likely to produce.

The objective of an aviation program should be to create a ready and reserve force, which can effectively and aggressively carry out its assigned mission in combat. The capability of an aviation component to fully meet this objective is affected by many factors. Important among these are the state of training and aggressiveness of the pilots and maintenance crews, and the number and

capabilities of the aircraft. As in any complex program, the optimum results can only be obtained by a careful balance of the essential elements, and not by maximizing one factor without considering its effect upon the others. For instance the safety aspects can receive so much emphasis that the realistic training necessary to develop skilled and aggressive pilots is severely compromised. Likewise the number of aircraft available could be increased by stopping training entirely and thereby eliminating the losses which stem from a realistic training program. Similarly the capabilities of the aircraft could be made higher if more time were spent in the development cycle, further perfecting the aircraft, but we would not have these aircraft until much later and fewer would be produced because of the increased cost. All of these results are inconsistent with the desired end objective of having an effective combat force trained and ready when needed. Because of the very long lead time required to alter the capabilities of an aviation force, the characteristics of the force at the beginning of a combat operation will prevail for a long period thereafter. A minimum of one year is required to substantially alter the state of training of the force; because of the long procurement lead time, a minimum of 2 years is required to effect an appreciable change in the number of aircraft; and a minimum of 4 to 8 years is required to make a significant

# WHAT CAN AVIATION HAVE ?

By Maj Mark Jones

The manner in which the safety aspects of the aviation program are carried out has a major effect upon the realism of the training and the results to be expected in combat





**Maj. Jones** was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1943. He is a Naval Aviator and has served with: VMB-413; MAG-33; VMR-153; VMF-311; VMF-114. In addition to graduating from the University of Oklahoma, he has attended: US Navy Post Graduate School; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Johns Hopkins University; George Washington University; University of Minnesota. At the present time he is CO, VMF (AW)-114.

change in the capabilities of the aircraft.

Past combat records clearly indicate that most of the worthwhile results in combat have been achieved by a relatively few well trained and aggressive pilots, and the increasing speed and complexity of present day and future aircraft indicates that this may be even more the case in the future. This type pilot is capable of accurately delivering his weapons under a great variety of conditions and of successfully dealing with the aircraft emergencies that arise. He is the master of his bird and he knows how to best employ it. To develop these characteristics in a pilot the training program must afford ample opportunities for the pilot to learn and to practice meeting these situations under controlled conditions so that he can master them one by one. Even a skilled pilot will become confused at some point if he encounters enough unfamiliar circumstances simultaneously. The disastrous effects in combat resulting from peacetime training programs that did not prepare the man or the organization for the combat situation are apparent throughout history, and can be seen as re-

cently as the early Army experience in Korea.

The manner in which the safety aspects of the aviation program are carried out has a major effect upon the nature and the realism of the training and the results to be expected in combat. While much valuable information is being originated under the present safety program, which serves to teach the pilot and the maintenance personnel the correct operating and maintenance procedures, there is an ever increasing number of orders being issued in the name of aviation safety, which severely restrict the training that can be carried out. Many of these orders are issued as a result of isolated or infrequently occurring incidents which led to an aircraft accident. While avoiding the training situation which could lead to a similar accident may reduce the number of accidents, it is also quite likely to result in training which does not provide the pilot confidence, aggressiveness, and mastery which will be required in combat. The number of restrictions on peacetime training, originating from all echelons, has increased daily, and little effort is apparently being directed toward

weighing the restrictions, either individually or as a group, against the loss of realism in training. Excessive restrictions on weather flying, mock combat, flameout practice, mirror approaches, spin practice, acrobatics and hours required to lead a flight, are in this category. The squadron commander is faced with the choice of either running an inadequate and unrealistic training program or of allowing his pilots to violate some published safety regulation.


The results of the methods now being employed in recording safety statistics and the command importance being placed upon these statistics serves as a strong inducement to avoid all training which involves risk, no matter how necessary the training. While aircraft accident records and accident boards were originally established to bring out facts that could be used to promote better maintenance and operating practices, they have since deteriorated into tribunals for fixing blame and for compiling relatively meaningless statistics on safety records. As a result of officially rating a squadron very heavily upon its safety record, the facts tend to be suppressed and the mistakes minimized. Knowing that any act or operation performed by his squadron can, and very likely will, be used as a basis for finding guilt if an accident results, the squadron commander is given a strong push by the present system to play all decisions safe, no matter what the effect on the capability of his unit. The qualities of imagination, initiative and aggressiveness which are vital to a commander in



**F8U-1 Crusader**

combat are stifled by the peacetime safety program.

The number of aircraft available to a force in combat will be a major contributing factor toward the effectiveness of the force. In previous wars aircraft have been much simpler in design and construction and the lead time required to produce additional aircraft in large quantities was much less than that required to produce the complex and costly aircraft of today. However, even in WWII and Korea, the shortage of aircraft was a critical factor for an extended period. Safety is an important factor in determining how well the requirement to have the maximum number of aircraft available can be met. A safety program which stresses pilot preservation above all other considerations, serves to reduce the number of aircraft, for it teaches the pilot to evaluate the emergency situation on the basis of his own safety without regard for the overall program. While the risk to the pilot may be high in some emergency situations, the greater risk resulting from the reduced effectiveness of the aviation force may outweigh this if aircraft losses are prohibitive, as they now are. Current estimates from the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics indicate that a very




*Is bailout prescribed too often?*


high percentage of the modern fighter and bomber aircraft in operation at the start of this fiscal year will not be available at the end of the year, because of aircraft accidents. Many of these losses could be avoided if the pilots were properly trained to make a maximum effort to preserve the aircraft. For instance, spins, flameouts, control system failures, etc. in modern high speed aircraft for which bailout is often prescribed by the present safety doctrine, can be successfully recovered from and the aircraft brought back in a high percentage of cases if the pilot is

properly trained to overcome these problems and has a will to bring the aircraft back. While more emphasis on the preservation of the aircraft could produce higher pilot losses, it is more likely to result in less if the pilot is properly indoctrinated on how to overcome the problem and has developed the confidence to attempt to solve it. At the present time he is generally taught that he cannot master these emergencies and that he should eject and forget the aircraft if they occur. In this frame of mind, he is not likely to think clearly or with the confidence necessary to overcome the problem.

The Navy and Marine Corps experience with the F4D all weather fighter, which has been introduced into service in the last year and a half, is typical. The contractor had previously proved that spin recovery could be effectively and consistently performed in this aircraft by performing several hundred spins in a great variety of configurations. In spite of this, the Navy and the Marine Corps do not allow the pilot to practice spins or spin recovery, and he is taught that he should eject and let the aircraft go if the aircraft does not respond readily to a recovery technique he has never had a chance to practice. This restriction has resulted in the loss of most of the F4Ds in service use which have inadvertently entered a spin, and has further served to deter the pilot from exploring and using that important part of the maneuver envelope from which spins might occur. This has appreciably reduced the effectiveness of the aircraft. The



*F4D-1 Skyrays*



### ***Do strict safety programs hamper their training?***

use of a few spin chute equipped aircraft—which were procured but were never used—in the operating squadrons could have saved many of these aircraft and would have produced pilots who were confident and competent to use the aircraft throughout its maneuver range. The present safety doctrine considers flameouts, under any condition where relight is not obtained by a given altitude, as sufficient cause for ejection and the loss of the aircraft. Dead stick landings have been successfully accomplished, with proper training, since the early days of aviation, and while the modern jets have a higher approach speed and sink rate, the problem is not appreciably different. Present airfields have runways of ample length to provide a comfortable margin in most cases for dead stick landings if the pilot has the necessary training and confidence to execute them. Where a flameout occurs out of range of an airfield, there are still few areas where a wide improved hard surface road cannot be found. With older types of aircraft, it was always considered essential for the pilot to know at all times where he was going to "set" the airplane if the engine quit, and this rule is still appli-

cable. Another situation, a control system failure, is considered extremely hazardous in the F4D in spite of the presence of a manual control system with somewhat reduced effectiveness. Because of the lack of training in the use of the manual or emergency system, many pilots lack the confidence and competence to effect a dead stick landing on the emergency system and will elect to eject instead. To properly solve these abnormal situations, the pilot must be exposed to the situation under controlled conditions until he is capable of solving the problem and he must be taught to abandon the aircraft only as a last resort.

Thus, while aviation safety has made important and worthwhile contributions to the effectiveness of the aviation program, it has at the same time seriously reduced the realism of the training that is accomplished and it has caused higher aircraft losses than are warranted. Safety is only one of several important elements in the overall program, and it cannot be considered solely by itself, or it will impair the overall program. It must be considered only in relation and conjunction with the other factors in the

program. Only when this is done will the Marine Corps achieve an aviation program which will produce the maximum capability from the resources available.

If the present overstressing of the negative aspects of aviation safety is not discontinued, we are likely to roll along blissfully and complacently with safety statistics to assure us that our program is becoming more effective each year, until the fateful day of combat arrives and the truth of the unbalance and weaknesses of the present program are revealed. Or with foresight, we can set down the goals we want to achieve in combat capability in our aviation program, and establish a training program which will realize these goals. A necessary part of this latter course will be the requirement that aviation safety be considered in the program only to the extent that it has a positive effect upon reaching the end objective, and not as an end in itself. By choosing this course we can ensure that the aviation component of the Marine Corps is capable and ready to carry out its combat mission, and not an impotent force with nothing but safety statistics to offer to meet the needs of combat. USMC



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## OBSERVATION POST

### SACK SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL

MB, NAVAL BASE, NY.—On 7 March 1949, the first Secretary of Defense James Forrestal appeared before a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, and testified at the hearings which finally resulted in the enactment of the "Uniform Code of Military Justice." The Secretary in endorsing the adoption of this legislation stated that the proposed law would benefit the military establishment by affording "the maximum amount of justice within the framework of a military organization." The particular value, however, as stressed by the Secretary, to be obtained by members of all the Armed Forces was the protection of their rights and more equal and uniform justice.

Now that over 6 years has passed under the UCMJ it is probably well to reflect on the good and bad results obtained from the enactment of this law as pertains to the framework of military organization. That the UCMJ protects the rights of those subject to it, is not questioned. If anything, it can be said for the Code that the protective benefits are readily apparent and working to full advantage.

It is with the stated desired benefit, "Maximum amount of justice within the framework of a military organization," (italics supplied) that fault can readily be found. This handicap appears, primarily, in the proceedings of the Special Court-Martial. The Court of Military Appeals has by its decisions now made the workings of a SpCM equally as intricate as its big brother, the General Court-Martial. In view of the limited legal qualifications possessed by the majority of the SpCM membership, and the imposing of more and

more restraining legal rules of procedure, this type court becomes vulnerable to make and repeat prejudicial errors. Each prejudicial error voids the work of the Court and in many cases obstructs justice; or becomes the basis for a rehearing of the case requiring more valuable time expended which could be well devoted to other pressing military duties. The straw that broke the camel's back was CMA's decision in US vs Rinehart which prohibits the membership, including the president of the SpCM, from using the Manual for Courts-Martial in closed session. The straw that broke the camel's back was CMA's decision in US vs Rinehart which prohibits the membership, including the president of the SpCM, from using the Manual for Courts-Martial in closed session. Agreed, that the layman's interpre-



tation of law would not be at all times consistent with the views taken by those learned in the subject; however, it is assumed that the result would be that of reasonable men dealing with any matter requiring mature judgment. Considering the vast number of dissenting opinions appearing in the rendered decisions, it seems that even the learned legal minds differ considerably on points of law.

If the SpCM is not to be afforded the services of a law officer under existing procedural rules, it seems that this type court should be abolished as a military tribunal. It appears that the only way to save expense and time is to make the GCM, where professional legal talent is

available, responsible for disposing of cases warranting trial, or the efforts of many hardworking, though unlegalistic, minds will be to no avail. As the law now stands a SpCM, having sat on a long drawn out case, could be reversed because of the oversight of a member not noticing the presence in closed session of a MCM or some other legal publication. This may well be a sensible legal determination but from a practicable viewpoint it certainly is inconsistent with "Maximum amount of justice within the framework of a military organization." It is recognized that the Rinehart decision does not prohibit the discussion of points of law based on legal publications by members in open session. This procedure could, it seems, become ridiculous if membership were to strenuously debate their viewpoints in front of counsel, accused and observers.

It must be recognized that the Court of Military Appeals has and will continue to do everything possible to maintain and uphold the high standards of the UCMJ but in so doing the Court has placed the SpCM function just about in the position of obsolescence as an effective military tribunal. There is no indication that the procedural rules for SpCM will become less intricate in the future; for this reason steps should be enacted immediately to either make a law officer available or to end the role of the SpCM in military jurisprudence.

Col H. R. Nusbaum

### TIME AND MONEY

MCSC, ALBANY, GA.—I would like to make a recommendation which could save the Marine Corps hundreds of dollars yearly.

I suggest that a code number be used for the wrist watches the Marine Corps has in use. These watches are made by 3 different manufacturers and are equipped with either a sweep hand or a conventional type second hand. Each is carried under a different stock number and nomenclature.

The present system causes extra

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paper work in receiving and issuing these watches. As an example: A unit may request 200 watches of a particular brand. Sometimes the issuing unit will not have 200 watches of the particular brand name requested but does have 200 of another make. In order to obtain the specified brand of watch, 200 unserviceable watches of the kind requested must be repaired.

A wrist watch is a timepiece and as long as it keeps accurate time, what matter the make?

A code should be devised for these wrist watches. I recommend a code number of W1-141 for the conven-

tional wrist watch and a code number of W2-142 for those with the sweep second hand.

With such a system, a unit requesting 200 watches with a sweep-hand would request them under code W2-142. The issuing unit would fulfill this order by shipping 200 watches with sweep second hands regardless of make or model.

This would simplify the ordnance supply system the Marine Corps has at present in procuring and issuing of wrist watches.

The recommended system is presently used in issuing binoculars 7X50 regardless of make or model.

There are 5 different makes and models of these binoculars. Some have mill scales. Those with a mill scale are carried under code C1-291, and those without a mill scale are under code C1-292. This coding has worked very well.

It would seem that if this system works in issuing binoculars it should work in issuing wrist watches, saving the Marine Corps money, time and a lot of confusion.

I am sure if the supply ordnance department of the Corps in HQMC were consulted on this they would go for it.

MSgt S. Guido

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# THE MILITARY PROFESSION

## Is Pay the Answer?

By Col Clifford B. Drake

RECENTLY ENACTED INTO LAW IS a pay increase for the military services, the primary purpose of which is to provide a system of monetary incentives designed to make a military career more attractive — attractive to the degree that the Armed Forces will be able to attract the right type of men in numbers sufficient to provide for an adequate defense. But, is a pay raise the answer?

It is recognized that a military career has only a limited appeal in our society. Our social mores and way of life just do not produce, on a wide enough scale, the attitude which causes men to seek the military profession. We are first and foremost a peace loving people and, by and large, we are conditioned to view military service, particularly compulsory service, with a certain amount of distaste — in times of so-called peace that is. We much prefer disarmament to preparation for war, and against this attitude it is difficult to develop a Christian argument. However, we are not at peace. We have a most determined enemy

whose ultimate goal is the destruction of our free, democratic way of life, albeit he is refraining from shooting at us at the moment.

### The Problem

The problem currently confronting the nation is a relatively new one. Never before, except in time of actual war, have we been called upon to raise and maintain such large military forces as we have today. And, to ensure that we are producing, manning and properly employing the complex systems of weapons and equipment required to satisfy the demands of modern warfare, calls for a highly competent, dedicated corps of professional officers and noncommissioned officers. That we do not have such a corps sufficient to our needs is made evident both by the high rate at which qualified men are leaving the services and by the difficulties all services are encountering in their efforts to replace them.

There is no question but that this problem is well recognized. The military services have been most active in instituting measures seeking its alleviation as has the Congress in the constructive legislation it has passed. Periodic pay increases, public sponsored housing, improved survivor benefits, contingency options on retirement, better medical care for dependents . . . all are positive measures toward improving the career aspects of military service. Yet, what is the result? We still are faced with the staggering waste, measured not only in dollars but more important in reduced combat readiness, caused by the high rate of turnover of skilled military personnel.

### The Cause and Effect

What is happening is simply this. Trained men are leaving the services because they are not receiving sufficient satisfactions in return for the contributions demanded from them. Or to put it another way, the negative aspects of military service overshadow the positive aspects except in the case of a minority group who are attracted primarily to the profession of arms itself. In effect, the country is requiring more from the man in uniform in terms of the nation's values than it is paying out to him in terms of his values. In words of one syllable there is just not

enough in it for the majority in return for the sacrifices demanded. On the face of it this is plain bad management. No other organization could survive under similar circumstances. Yet the defense of the country hangs in the balance.

### Is There a Solution?

What is the answer? Is the new pay scale the solution? Certainly, it is a step in the right direction, but a pay raise in itself is not the full answer. Study after study on the general question of why men work reveals, surprisingly enough, that once an adequate subsistence level has been met, pay alone becomes a rather low order incentive. A multitude of data has been collected concerning why men leave the military services, and here again pay is not neces-

somewhat out of whack in the Armed Forces at the moment, needs little elaboration.

### Incentives vs Motives

A man will join and contribute his efforts to an organization only when he is properly motivated. Ordinarily, the strongest classes of human motives are those of self-preservation and self-satisfaction. This in itself goes a long way in explaining why there is comparatively little difficulty in staffing the Armed Forces when the life of the country is in obvious jeopardy and similarly why it is most difficult to retain men in the service when the motive of self-satisfaction dominates. However, both motives always prevail in one degree or another and both must be satisfied if we are to obtain the services required. The obvious approach to satisfying these motives is through the direct offering of positive incentives and reducing or eliminating negative incentives. A second and more subtle way is, by persuasion, to so alter the motives that they will be susceptible to the inducements available.

### A System of Incentives

Generally speaking, incentives can be classified as being either objective or subjective. Objective incentives relate to material things, conditions, non-material satisfactions, and intangibles which can be offered as inducements; while subjective incentives pertain mainly to the techniques of persuasion.

Although by no means exhaustive, the following types of objective incentives will serve as good examples of what we have to work with:

- 1) Material incentives usually are the first ones that come to mind. Lumped into this category are such things as pay and allowances, retirement benefits, housing, dependent's medical care, survivor benefits, commissaries, clubs, exchanges, recreational facilities, etc.—all of which have a value in a materialistic sense and which can be offered directly as an inducement to serve. Because of our moneyed economy and the high degree of specialization and social and economic compartmentation that exists in our society we tend to greatly overemphasize material inducements. As was previously pointed out, once the subsistence



sarily the controlling item. It would be redundant at this point to attempt to analyze the answers to the question of why men leave the service, but a significant generalization can be drawn to the effect that desirable men leave the service not necessarily because of what is wrong with it but rather because they have good reason to believe that they will receive more in terms of their sense of values in civilian life than they will by remaining in the service for a like effort on their part. Carrying it one step further, they believe that for an increase in output they will receive greater compensation in civilian life than the country is prepared to pay for increased effort in the service—and, this is not just measured in dollars.

At this point we might well examine the system of incentives which cause men to contribute their services to organizations and then see how the military services measure up in this regard. That the economy of incentives, i.e. what is offered in return for the services demanded, is



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level has been obtained, i.e. adequate food, clothes, housing, medical care, etc., material inducements alone assume a rather low degree of importance. This view may not be readily acceptable, but one has only to recall to mind the saying, "money does not buy everything," to give it some credence. The reason we intend to overemphasize material incentives is that they quite often serve to satisfy some other motive or reinforce some other incentive.

2) The second type of incentive, one which is more personal and non-materialistic in nature, includes the opportunities that are offered for acquiring distinction, position, status, prestige, standing in the community, etc. This is of great importance once a satisfactory subsistence level has been reached, although one may not choose to recognize it as such at first thought. However, it is not being too unrealistic to suggest that one of the real values in a system of differential rewards for services rendered is the recognition that goes with such reward or what can be bought with them in the way of recognition.

3) One of the most powerful non-material incentives is the offering of the means whereby an individual may satisfy his idealistic or altruistic motives or drives. In this category fall those satisfactions derived from knowing that one has done an important job well, that one has contributed measurably to the well-being of his country or fellow men. Pride of workmanship, a tangible demonstration of patriotism, or a sacrifice for the good of others are examples of the satisfactions to be achieved under this type of inducement.

4) Closely allied with the foregoing is the incentive which offers one the feeling of actual participation in a major worthwhile organization,

e.g. being a part of a winning team that is in the "Big Time," making a valuable contribution in an organization that plays a prominent role in shaping the course of world events. This may or may not be related to the desire for personal prestige.

5) Physical working conditions can be a most effective incentive from both a positive and negative standpoint.

6) Then, there is the question of social attractiveness. Does the organization offer a system of personal relations which make for compatibility, does one fit in easily, do we like the men with whom we serve, are we at home or are we strangers in a hostile organization?

7) Related to the question of social compatibility but of perhaps more importance is the question of comradeship. What is offered in this regard? Is there a strong bond of comradeship or are we continually at each others' throats, competing for material gains.

On the subjective side, as was said, we rely mainly on the art of persuasion. One tangible incentive in this regard is to establish a set of conditions which will exclude individuals from serving unless they contribute worthwhile services. In other words one must measure up to exacting standards in order to enjoy a military career. Other forms of persuasion involve selling or propagandizing an individual on the idea that belonging to the organization is in his best interests. And finally, there is the creating of a national or social attitude which will tend to motivate more individuals toward a military career.

#### Incentives . . . Military vs Civilian

How do these incentives stack up in comparing military service with the inducements offered in civilian

life? There can be no question but that a military career equals, if not better, in a good many cases, the opportunity of knowing that one is doing an important job, of gaining pride of workmanship, of satisfying the motive of patriotism, for achieving social attractiveness and comradeship, and for gaining the sense of being in the "Big Time." Wherever you go in the military service you cannot help but have a sense of being at home, you know that you belong, conditions and surroundings are always familiar, you always have a friend and you cannot escape from the feeling of belonging to one of the biggest most important organizations in the world and that you are an integral part of it. There is no doubt but that what you are doing is worthwhile and vitally necessary to the preservation of the free world.

On the question of physical conditions of work, the lot of the professional military man is a hardy one to say the least. Not only that, but we do not want to so concentrate on creature comforts and attitudes that they tend to destroy fighting efficiency as was the case in certain elements of the military services following WWII. We can tolerate neither softness nor petticoat treatment. Austerity, in its place, is a virtue. But, this does not mean that we have to go out of our way to be uncomfortable, except when training or operational conditions so demand. Unquestionably, the value of this incentive can be increased either through new measures designed to improve physical conditions or through the elimination of unnecessary discomforts or heckling inconveniences. It behooves military commanders at all levels to take stock of the conditions under which their men work and live. This is nothing more than the exercise of the functions of leadership. Furthermore, at congressional and departmental level, it might well pay a handsome dividend if an inventory were taken of the restrictive measures now in effect which operate against making this an effective incentive. A program such as those to report reductions in paper work, improved work methods, etc. could be instituted to further the idea of improving physical working conditions.

Material incentives receive the

greatest attention probably because they are the easiest to isolate and because we have been conditioned to believe that they have an inordinate effect on our well being. Harking back to the days before WWII, the general philosophy that prevailed then was that one chose the military profession with the understanding that the financial remuneration would be small and that unlike most civilian occupations there would be no opportunity for increased earnings such as overtime pay, merit pay raises, bonuses, commissions, fees, etc. Nevertheless, this was quite acceptable because it was understood

whole, has been narrowed to the extent that these benefits no longer are effective in satisfying the other motives or reinforcing the other incentives which have some to depend on material inducements.

#### How to Create a Favorable Balance of Incentives

From the foregoing it should be apparent that there are at least 3 areas in which something can be done to create a favorable balance of incentives — that is, a system of incentives which is reasonable from the standpoint of what the country can afford to offer and which in turn



that there would be other means which would enable one to enjoy a standard of living, a status in the community, and a measure of social security comparable to what one could expect to earn in some other form of endeavor. These other means were those things which we have now come to call "fringe benefits." For a profession wherein the conditions of service are subject to such an uncontrollable complex of variables, as is the case in the military, this seemed like a logical scheme of compensation.

But, what has happened? This situation no longer prevails. Although at the subsistence level the material incentives may be adequate and despite the beneficial legislation which has been enacted, the gap between "fringe benefits" available to the military and civilian, taken as a

is reasonable from the standpoint of the individual whom it is desired to attract to a military career.

First, available material incentives can be so manipulated that they will serve to provide the degree of reinforcement necessary to satisfy the motive of status. Second, federal, state and local agencies, as well as the information media and various civic business and religious organizations, have it within their means to create a more favorable attitude on the part of the general public towards the military profession. And third, the negative incentives or disadvantages of military service can be further reduced. Obviously, these are all interrelated.

Without intending to detract from the importance of the latter 2 areas mentioned above, it is believed that the question posed in the title will

best be answered by concentrating on the first proposition, manipulating available material incentives.

At the outset it should be manifest that we cannot expect to compete in the civilian market for manpower on a dollar for dollar basis. Already, one out of every ten dollars spent in the United States goes for national defense in one form or another. To attempt to raise the pay scale of the military so that it in itself would provide all the incentive necessary, would boost the military budget to prohibitive heights. Not only is this rather bad economics, but, more important from our standpoint, the caliber of men so attracted to the profession would be somewhat questionable. There have been few "soldiers of fortune" who have made any measurable contribution in the moral sense.

The pay increase enacted serves to satisfy the requirement for an adequate subsistence level, and since it includes an improved differential between grades, it will assist in reinforcing other incentives, such as recognition, but not to the degree necessary.

#### Make the Military Profession Something Special

Specifically, what is proposed is that we take the material incentives (other than pay and its accouterments) which currently exist and strengthen them to the degree that they become very positive attractions. This means operating the commissaries, exchanges, clubs and other beneficial services, on such a basis that the career serviceman will be able to acquire those tangible things and attitudes which in turn will give him added status amongst his civilian contemporaries. What is needed is to create a set of desirable conditions which can be enjoyed only by virtue of continued active military service. That this can be done with a relatively small dollar outlay, there is no doubt. One has only to look at the special advantages which were available just prior to WWII. From this, it seems to follow logically that faced with the prospect of losing these special privileges, privileges that are not normally available in civilian life, the man who is contemplating leaving the service will take a long, second look.

Immediately the cry is heard that

such a scheme makes the military a special privilege group. Well, just what is wrong with that? Is it really foreign to our ideas of a democratic society? True it has been said that to create special groups whose special interests are catered to is incompatible with our way of life. But, is it? Since the turn of the century there has grown up an extensive network of organizations whose only purpose is to further the special interests of one group or another. Almost every civilian falls into some sort of group which has an organization dedicated to furthering his particular interests. The labor and veterans organizations are prime examples. In fact, within the labor movement alone there are still other organizations to look out for the self endowed special interests, rights, privileges, etc. of various racial, religious and other minority groups. It goes on ad infinitum. Not that we have any particular quarrel with such a system; it is mentioned here to emphasize the point that the military profession has no such paternalistic or protective organizations, yet

must compete in an environment which abounds in them.

The military is in the hands of the Congress and the civilian officials of government, it is subordinate to and responsive to the will of the people, and no responsible military man would want to change this. However, Congress and the Administration are not immune to the pressures exerted by special groups which represent various private interests. The situation now is that the military services find they are, in fact, themselves a special interest group—a group in which the special interests have a special interest—namely the military pay roll.

The impact of the military pay roll on the national and local economies has had a most telling effect—it in itself is big business, and unfortunately, the impression has been created that getting the serviceman's pay check into the right channels takes precedence over the well being of the serviceman himself. Possibly this is an illusion, but witness the lobbies against the commissaries, exchanges, package stores, etc., and

they have not been without success. Not only that, but there are those in influential positions who protest and decry any public support for improving the amenities of service life.

It is somewhat of a paradox that these pressure groups should have such an apparent sympathetic ear in the right places when the defense of the country is being jeopardized by a lack of qualified men in the Armed Forces. Not only does this seemingly unwarranted concern for these private interests work against the effectiveness of the material incentives for military service, but more important it is a rather degrading slap in the face to the man who has chosen to serve his country in uniform—a rather strong negative incentive to say the least.

If we are going to solve this problem of man power, negative incentives to military service must be eliminated wherever possible. In their place conditions must be created which will make it a definite privilege to serve in the Armed Forces of the United States, and the returns for such service must be of such an order that will enable the man in uniform to occupy a proper position amongst his civilian contemporaries. The impression, even if only an illusion, that the serviceman takes second place to those whose primary interest is in his pay check must be destroyed. The military services rightfully should be a special interest group, but the interest should be centered on what can be put into the group to strengthen the national defense not what can be got out of it to further private interests. Indeed, make the military profession something special.

#### A Personal Conclusion

No article of this nature should be concluded without a personal statement of the beliefs and motives of the author. First, let me make it clear that I have no axe to grind—I am in no way dissatisfied with my chosen career—I carry no torch. The sole purpose of this article is to point one way towards a solution to a most serious problem—a problem the answer to which I am firmly convinced does not lie in a pay raise alone. The answer is not easy—but it is there—and it will take a bit of courage to make it effective.

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Intended in the main for engineers and technicians, this complete survey of present day achievements and possible future developments presents the latest information on rocket motors and their applications from an engineer's point of view. Both solid and liquid propellant motors are discussed, the latter more fully as being of greater interest to the engineer. A special feature is the comprehensive bibliography which helps to make this work an invaluable introduction for those entering the field of rockets and guided missiles.

The Macmillan Co., NY.

## FRONTIER TO SPACE

ERIC BURGESS. Foreword by SIR HAROLD SPENCER JONES, The Astronomer Royal

This gives an account of how modern rockets are enabling man to obtain accurate information on conditions at the frontier to interplanetary space. It explains how the high altitude vehicles are instrumented to do this and outlines the kind of experiments which are being carried out. The book is fully illustrated and also contains a collection of references and modern data which will be found of great help to the serious student.

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Edited by C. G. BROWNE and THOMAS S. COHN

This volume, the result of a broad survey of leadership literature, is an attempt to select those published studies which appear to make some singular or significant contribution to various aspects of the whole leadership area. The present selections do not represent any specific area of leadership activity, but rather cut across a number of areas—business, recreation, education, unions, military and clubs. Neither has an attempt been made to promote any specific approach to, nor theory of, leadership. The book presents a sampling of key studies which may provide a further step toward the organization of leadership material around some central principles, theories and methods.

Interstate Printers, Danville, Ill.

## THE ORDEAL OF WOODROW WILSON

HERBERT HOOVER

This book portrays President Wilson striving to give the world a good and just peace. When, in Paris, he found this impossible, he fought not only to set up the League of Nations, but to make it part of the treaties so that it might later remedy the inequities and injustices of the peace. Mr. Hoover tells of the opposition that arose to the Treaty and to the League at home, how Mr. Wilson set out to save them and was stricken in Colorado. During his long illness the fight to ratify the Treaty and the League was lost in the Senate—completing the tragedy. The book concentrates on the period between 1915 and 1921.

McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., NY. \$6.00

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The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md. \$12.50

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For people in or about to enter managerial life, here is a practical and readable guide to the problems that the manager is likely to encounter in the most highly charged aspect of his work — his relations with his fellow workers and employees. Drawing upon the latest research in the psychology of personality and social psychology, the author discusses his subject from the single person on up through the large mass of people, thereby covering the major categories of personnel problems that must be faced by the manager in modern business.

University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. \$5.00

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## THE SOVIET FAR EAST

ERICH THIEL

The Soviet Far East is a desolate region with a great economic potential — an area of about 1½ million square miles, extending from Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean. This isolated country is of vital strategic importance to the Soviet Union: it is the gateway to the ocean. Translated from the German, this regional geography is the first account in English to cover the subject matter so thoroughly.

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., NY. \$8.00

## POLAND: East-Central Europe Under the Communists

OSCAR HALECKI, Editor

This volume continues the task of presenting accurate, comprehensive information and analysis on each of the countries of Mid-Europe under communist domination. It is one of a series planned by the Mid-European Studies Center, a unit of the Free Europe Committee. The fullest measure of available communist and Western Polish data and the best critical evaluations of that material were used in compiling this book.

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., NY. \$10.00

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Here is the permanent record, documented and definitive, of the Japanese atrocities and other war crimes in WW II. The picture which emerges here is one of stark horror, recording as it does the factual details of brutality on the part of the Japanese forces to prisoners of war, civil internees and the populations of occupied countries. Lord Russell's previous book dealt with the infamies perpetrated by the Nazis.

E. P. Dutton & Co., NY. \$5.00

## DEATH OF A NATION

CLIFFORD DOWDEY

Confederate forces invaded the United States of America in the waning days of June 1863. On the first 3 days of July a momentous battle was fought at Gettysburg, Pa. For 3 days two great armies, the Confederate under Robert E. Lee, the Union troops under George Meade, were locked in violent combat. This is the story of the Confederate role in that battle. It is a narrative of great detail and power, and a searching examination of the reasons for the ultimate defeat of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Alfred A. Knopf, NY. \$5.00

## THE SPLENDID LITTLE WAR

FRANK FREIDEL

"It has been a splendid little war," wrote John Hay to Theodore Roosevelt after the fall of Santiago. Little, the Spanish-American War was; it was over in barely 4 months. Splendid? Perhaps for those at home, reading the blazing headlines about a war which, in its ineptitudes, its phenomenally lucky victories, its ironies, often resembled a comic opera. But for the men who fought in it, it was as bloody, dirty and heroic a war as any in history. The volume contains more than 300 photographs and line drawings made on the spot by noted artists.

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## VICTORY: The Life of Lord Nelson OLIVER WARNER

Nelson is one of that small group of heroes in whom interest never wanes. Oliver Warner has written about him not in exclusively maritime terms, but as a man who was exalted, kindly and a genius at sea, and who was vain and vulnerable ashore. Nelson's flaws were those of a man who goes beyond the limits of the ordinary in everything he does. The introduction to the volume is by Nicholas Monsarrat.

Little, Brown & Co., Boston. \$6.50

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## THE SMALLER DRAGON

JOSEPH BUTTINGER. 535 pages, illustrated. Frederick A. Praeger, NY. \$6.00

When the Geneva Agreement creating 2 separate Vietnams was signed in the summer of 1954, the movement of refugees out of the communist areas in the north, towards the free south, increased greatly. At that time many French and Vietnamese, together with the few interested Americans wondered if this refugee movement was really desirable; it was generally conceded that an extension of communist control over the southern part of the country was just a matter of time.

During this dramatic period Mr. Joseph Buttinger as a representative of the International Rescue Committee arrived in Saigon to work on refugee matters. In the few short months of his stay he discovered that there were qualities in the Vietnamese which did not make communization of their country as inevitable as he had been led to believe.

Mr. Buttinger also discovered that the record of the rich history of this country is scattered in many volumes and these are most often out of date or not in English. The greatest gaps in the narrative appeared to be in the early history of this part of Southeast Asia. He thus set about remedying this deficiency by preparing the volume entitled *The Smaller Dragon*. This book is a political history of Vietnam, starting with the mists of legend and concluding with the beginning of the present century.

South Vietnam is strategically located at the tip of Southeast Asia and is one of the countries in that part of the world which identifies its interests with those of the US. The president of this new democracy, Ngo Dinh Diem, is not only strongly anti-communist but also rejects the appeals of neutralism; a particular-

ly significant fact in an area where neutralism has many adherents. An understanding of Vietnam thus seems desirable for those who would be well informed, and it is for this reason that the publication of *The Smaller Dragon* is both useful and timely.

The history of Vietnam, like that of most other countries is one of conflict. Vietnam was subjected to Chinese domination for centuries and during this prolonged subjugation the Vietnamese adopted much



of the Sinic culture. Yet this profound influence did not lead to the absorption of the Vietnamese by the Chinese; on the contrary the Vietnamese efforts for independence never ceased and were eventually successful.

Once Vietnam became independent, it began to expand southwards. This movement brought the Vietnamese into conflict with the Cambodians then possessors of Cochinchina, with the result that the Vietnamese drove the Cambodians out of the delta of the Mekong. Vietnam then assumed the characteristic figure 8 configuration it has today: a north centered around the Red

River, a south built around the Mekong River delta, and a narrow mountainous waist connecting the 2 areas.

This elongated shape of Vietnam, some thousand miles from north to south, and the concentration of people and agricultural production around the 2 great river systems, are facts of geography which had considerable impact on political activity in Vietnam. People and rice make for power, and when this power developed around 2 poles it was inevitable that conflict between these poles would occur. The present separation of Vietnam into 2 separate states is not new; earlier civil wars had had the same result.

Internal conflict in Vietnam reached such intensity that even when the French arrived and set about conquering their land, the Vietnamese did not set aside personal struggles in order to face the French with a unified front.

There is in this volume a particular merit to be found in the copious notes and comprehensive bibliography. Fully half of the book is devoted to these invaluable aids to research and further reading. In addition, the author provides a chronology of events which, in 47 pages, sketches the history of Vietnam from 1900 to the present.

Reviewed by Col V. J. Croizat


Ed: For 2 years this reviewer served as a Marine Liaison Officer in Vietnam, and is the author of *Vietnam in Review* which appeared in the Jan 1958 GAZETTE.

## THE WORLD IN SPACE

ALEXANDER MARSHACK. 176 pages, illustrated. Thomas Nelson & Sons, NY. \$4.95

Since the successful orbit of the first Soviet sputnik on 4 October 1957, many of us may have gained the impression that the International Geophysical Year was designed for the purpose of forming propaganda camps on either side of the Iron Curtain to cheer the successes and jeer the failures of the 2 major participants in the satellite or space race. This is a badly mistaken impression for many reasons as the reader of *The World in Space* will find.

The book points out that the International Geophysical Year (IGY), from 1 July 1957 to the end of 1958, is the greatest scientific research pro-



gram that has ever been undertaken. For the first time in history, 64 nations (including most of those in the communist camp) from more than 2500 scientific stations and bases, are participating in a simultaneous assault on the secrets of the earth, the sun and space. The period has been selected because the sun is at a peak of a sunspot cycle, which occurs every 11 years. This is of great importance in most of the 13 programs being undertaken: Glaciology, Oceanography, Meteorology, Solar Activity, Aurora and Airglow, Cosmic Rays, Ionospheric Physics, Geomagnetism, Gravity, Seismology, Radioactivity Studies, Latitudes and Longitudes and Measurement of the Earth, and Rocket and Satellite Exploration of the Upper Atmosphere.

The author's approach to a discussion of these problems is to trace the development of man's knowledge of them from ancient times to the present, showing the state of relative ignorance of our earth, and the space above it, which still exists. The methods of attack being used on a vast and internationally coordinated basis to solve the problems and eliminate this ignorance are represented in some detail.

The importance of these investigations to the armies and navies of the world is tremendous. For instance, the ability to predict how and when sunspot activity will blank out worldwide communications might be the basis of launching a Pearl Harbor type of surprise attack. Without the radio means of ordering a retaliatory attack, the other side might not survive. In addition

to the increased knowledge of radio and radar phenomena, advances in navigation, map-making, weather prediction and control, and the ability to use space for instrumented vehicles and eventually for man are all of extreme military importance.

The author's major emphasis is on the scientific knowledge to be acquired. Some of the purely scientific facts discussed about the sun are among the book's most interesting. In one of the many fine illustrations is a picture of a "prominence" or explosion on the sun's surface, which "rose 250,000 miles above the sun in a little over 30 minutes, at a speed of about 400,000 miles an hour." Another amazing fact about the sun is that the corona or sun's outer atmosphere has a temperature of 1,000,000° C extending for millions of miles beyond the sun. The reader can't avoid being impressed with the unbelievable power of nature, and the sun in particular, when faced with facts such as these.

The author has published feature articles, technical pieces, picture stories, and radio, TV and film scripts. He has been IGY Consultant for CBS. He has also had the wisdom of having his manuscript checked by the directors or high officials of the major IGY programs.

Reviewed by LtCol H. J. Woessner

Ed: Senior Marine Officer at the Naval Academy, this reviewer is a frequent contributor to the GAZETTE.

## THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE PACIFIC, 1897-1909

WILLIAM R. BRAISTED. 282 pages; bibliography, index, map. University of Texas Press. \$5.00


"In a constantly changing international political scene, the United States Navy provided the ballast which kept American foreign policy on an even keel." With this sentence, Dr. Braisted ends his excellent, detailed account of 12 important years. The interplay between diplomacy and naval power—diplomatic requirements demanding greater naval effort, and greater naval strength making possible a wider range of diplomatic action—gives the author a sweeping theme.

This book documents those exciting years when the influences of Roosevelt, Dewey and Mahan changed the entire pattern of the US Navy—the years in which this coun-

try found its place as a world power. The intricate and delicate political maneuverings in the Pacific are examined in detail. The long-term results of Japan's victory over Russia come into focus. It is easy to see how Japan became a potential enemy, after having been a friend for so long. This change, like so many changes, was the product of the inevitable sweep of history. Vigorous nations, sure of their destiny and conscious of their strength, were bound to come into conflict as the frontiers of the world approached their finite limit.

This book is particularly good in its elucidation of the shifts in international policies and alliances. Specific issues, such as the "Open Door" in China, could produce temporary cooperation, but some basic patterns always recur. The sympathy between Great Britain and this country, their fear and distrust of Germany, the ambivalence of France and Japan, are all clearly treated. Incidentally, except when they had been too badly beaten by Japan, no one seemed to love the Russians very much or for very long. An interesting sidelight on the Russian mind is given us in the account of their duplicity over railroads and communications while ostensibly partners with the Western powers in the suppression of the Boxer uprising.

Dr. Braisted is most objective about American imperialism. Our actions in Hawaii, in the Philippines, in Cuba and in Colombia, are given a clear-minded appraisal. This is not the place or time for discussion of the moral and international issues involved, but certain



questions do arise. Could this country, considering the climate and temper of the times, have taken any other course? Many of the problems were demanding in the extreme—the 2-ocean Navy, the defense of the Philippines, the China policy—but no middle course or safe haven ever appeared.

The book touches lightly on the role of Marines. Their participation in the suppression of the Boxer uprising is noted and a number of instances in which they were alerted and moved are cited. This is not really an omission. Dr. Braisted does not concern himself very much with the details of fights or, except as they affect power balances, the makeup of forces. The evolution and true meaning of the balanced fleet concept can safely be left to others.

Our author cannot resist attacking one pleasant little naval story. He does not believe that Capt Chichester, Royal Navy, placed the heavy cruiser *Immortalité* between VAdm Diederichs' *Kaiserin Augusta* and *Olympia* in Manila Bay. He feels that this is one of those retrospective stories invented in the interest of Anglo-American comity. Perhaps so—but this reviewer has had the story from Chichester's family and read it in his memoirs and hates not to believe it.

In summary, Dr. Braisted has given us a most valuable work. His scholarship and painstaking documentation translate into a lucid and rewarding exposition of a stirring period in our history and of the Navy's leading role in it. The progress of naval thought and the roles of the various agencies involved in our naval evolution are set forth in detail and in patterns which make for a most readable book.

Reviewed by Col A. M. Fraser

Ed: Currently attending the National War College, the reviewer was stationed at HQMC prior to his present assignment.

## ESCAPE FROM CORREGIDOR

EDGAR D. WHITCOMB; 274 pages; Henry Regnery Co., Chicago. \$4.50

The life of a POW is a drab existence in most cases. But Edgar D. Whitcomb, alias Bob Johnson, managed to wander about quite freely and even enjoy night life in Shanghai after the Japanese swished a net over him.

His operation plan for escape is highly recommended over the Count de Monte Cristo "shroud bit" or the John Dillinger "wooden gun caper."

After swimming away from the "Rock" (after the surrender), Whitcomb landed on Luzon and received shelter and aid from friendly Philippinos before he ran into some decidedly "unfriendly" natives who turned him over to the enemy. Flung forthwith into the bastille at Fort Santiago in Manila, he is questioned at length by the Japanese who punctuate their remarks and questions with solid blows of a lead pipe.

The Japanese, being a suspicious lot, do not believe he is Robert Johnson, a civilian and son of Fred Johnson, a mining engineer. As a matter of fact, he is not Robert Johnson. He is Lt Edgar D. Whitcomb, an Army Air Force pilot, and if the Japs see through this Jekyll, they are liable to tan his Hyde.



Not wanting to be shot down cold stone dead in the market place, Whitcomb keeps a stiff upper lip and is transferred to Santo Tomas University where all the civilians are interned.

Santo Tomas is the Caribe Hilton of the internment camps of the Far East but Whitcomb keeps working his bolt and finally the Japanese put him on a boat and ship him to Shanghai where several Americans finance him and support him in the style in which we would all like to become accustomed.

He is finally repatriated aboard the *Gripsholm*, in an exchange of Japanese and American Nationals, and gets back to the States where he eventually flies against the enemy for the first time.

Ed Whitcomb was one of a group of aviators who got to the Philippines a few days before the war started. They were shot down before they ever got up and spent the rest of the time of the 6-month war in the Philippines moving from one unit to the other. Whitcomb escaped to Corregidor when Bataan fell and was assigned to one of the heterogeneous units composed of Marines, Philippinos, Army and Navy personnel on Monkey Point.

The full force of the Japanese amphibious assault hit this section of Corregidor, and Whitcomb's description of the final hours of the "Rock" are factual and gripping.

He speaks highly and authoritatively of the Marines he fought with and of those he met before he was captured.

This is an off-beat POW chronicle because it deals lightly with the horrors most returnees had to relate. It is fact that reads like fiction, and it comes with an introduction written by Lt Gen Field Harris, USMC(Ret).

Reviewed by CWO Fred Stolley, USMC (Ret)  
Ed: CWO Stolley was captured on Corregidor with the 4th Marines and spent 42 months as a prisoner-of-war.

## POCKET BATTLESHIP

ADMIRAL THEODOR KRANCKE and H. J. BRENNERKE. 239 pages, illustrated. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., NY. \$3.95

This book narrates the tale of the war cruise of the German "Pocket Battleship" *Admiral Scheer* in the winter months of 1940-41. The story is told by her Captain at the time, Theodor Krancke, and the German Naval writer, H. J. Brenneke. It is naturally recorded from the German point of view, and this serves to add to its interest for the American reader.

As part of its naval build-up prior to WWII, Germany built 3 "Pocket Battleships"—a hybrid ship-type registering between a battleship and heavy cruiser. The ships, *Scheer*, *Graf Spee*, and *Deutschland* or *Lutzow*, were designed largely for commerce warfare, and they were so used.

The defeat of the *Graf Spee* in December 1939 in South Atlantic waters, has been the subject of several books. The *Graf Spee* sank only 50,000 tons of Allied shipping, whereas the *Scheer* sent to the bottom more

than 3 times this much—and was not destroyed until 1945 while in a shipyard for overhaul. She was known to the Germans as a lucky ship and was not defeated at sea.

Capt Theodor Krancke (now Admiral) is cast in a hero's role which is mildly distasteful as the reader reflects on the authorship of the book. He amply demonstrated his professional skill in carrying out his mission of destruction and disruption of Allied commerce in 2 oceans—South Atlantic and Indian. A notably gripping portion of the book is the description of the initial passages through the Denmark Strait. Marine officers will find food for thought in following the actions of a commander on completely independent duty under conditions requiring daring and imagination.

This story brings us back to the exciting and sober days prior to our entrance into WWII, and provides vivid descriptions of a surface type Naval warfare we will likely never witness again.

Reviewed by Lt Col T. M. Burton

Ed: The reviewer is stationed at Camp Butler, 3d Mar Div.

## EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

GEN PAUL VON LETTOW-VORBECK with foreword by John Gunther. 300 pages, illustrated. Robert Speller and Sons, NY. \$6.00

Take some time out and go to war with Col Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck as he spends the years of WWI fighting for his fatherland in German East Africa. One cannot fail to be inspired by this saga of a fighting man who never lost a battle, never was defeated, and never was forced to surrender despite the tremendous odds against him.

"... There is almost always a way out, even of an apparently hopeless position, if the leader makes up his mind to face the risks." This is the philosophy of Von Lettow, the "lion of Africa," of whom John Gunther has said, "... there are no more like him."

*East African Campaigns* traces the history of German efforts in East Africa during WWI. And it is fascinating history indeed. This is an amazing story of how a devoted and strong-willed commander (with his eye on the objective) was able to inspire a small and ill-equipped force to engage a tremendous number of

Allied troops who might otherwise have fought in Europe. With a military force of 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 native Askari, Von Lettow held some 300,000 Allied troops at bay for the greater part of the war. Over 130 generals took the field against him and over 60,000 men fell fighting him.

In matter of fact tones, Gen von Lettow-Vorbeck recalls his activities as Colonel Commandant of German forces in East Africa from the time he landed in Dar-es-Salaam in Jan 1914 until his departure 5 years later. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, this experienced one-time battalion commander of Marines deduced that, if war should come, his objective would be to tie down as many enemy forces as possible and thus reduce pressures in the main theater. He never lost sight of this objective and the results of his campaigns attest to the high degree of his success.

As a recital of guerrilla warfare and the problems attendant thereto, *East African Campaigns* makes superb reading. Individual actions are described in some detail and with-

out the usual emotional overtones that characterize war memoirs. The attention to logistic matters which characterized German planning is of interest. After an initial support organization comprising railroads, roads, trucks, and as many as 100,000 native bearers, the Germans shifted to a "live off the land and off the enemy" supply system, admirably suited to the type of warfare which they were forced to wage. Their movements were often necessitated by a need for new harvests. Their offensive operations were frequently undertaken as a means of procuring military supplies.

*East African Campaigns* is of much interest to both the general reader and the military man. For both, it is an interesting bit of history that is well worth reading. For the latter there are many lessons in the conduct of small wars and guerrilla operations. Most of all, however, it is an excellent case history in command and leadership.

Reviewed by Lt Col H. H. Reichner, Jr.

Ed: The reviewer is an instructor at the Naval War College. Prior to his present assignment he was on the G-3 staff HQMC.

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East Coast — Memorial Services  
at Boston Commons




THE 1ST MARDIV ASSOCIATION had a double-barreled reunion again this year with the West Coast Section meeting in San Diego, July 18, 19, 20 and the East Coast Section getting together in Boston, August 8, 9 and 10.

The West Coast reunion was held in the plush El Cortez Hotel. Registration began Friday and that afternoon the members went to the Recruit Depot to view a 2,000-man parade. LtGen E. A. Craig, USMC (Ret) reviewed the troops and Col R. W. Boyd acted as commander of the parading troops.

At memorial services the next morning LtCdr C. J. Griffen offered the invocation and LtGen J. T. Selden, USMC (Ret) spoke, encompassing the importance to the nation of the Marine Corps as a force-in-readiness. The benediction was given by Lt Keith McPherson, a former Marine Corps officer.

During the short business meeting held next, LtCol Mitchell Paige, Guadalcanal Medal of Honor winner was elected deputy vice president. He replaced Col R. W. Boyd, outgoing deputy vice president. At the meeting, San Francisco was rec-



West Coast — Parade and review at MCRDep, San Diego

## 1st DIVISION REUNIONS

ommended as the site for next year's reunion.

At 2000 Saturday an overflow crowd was seated in the Caribbean Room for the banquet. Following the meal, Maj Roy Whitlock introduced the guests and the speakers at the head table. He presented Generals G. C. Thomas and John T. Selden, both retired and former 1st Division commanders, and E. A. Craig who commanded the 1st Brigade in Korea.

Next on the list of introductions were MajGen E. W. Snedecker, current Division Commander, Richard Tregaskis, author of *Guadalcanal Diary*, Sgt Robert McKenzie, Division Symbolic Marine, and Sgt Robert Duffy, Sergeant-at-arms and Father James J. Fitzgerald, Chaplain.

The banquet program was concluded with the presentation of the John Basilone Scholarship to Michael Wilson of Indio, Calif. Wilson is the son of a deceased Marine.

In Boston, the First Corps of Cadets Armory was the headquarters for the "Old" and "New" Breed Marines.

During the 3-day meeting Gen Clifton B. Cates, former Commandant of the Corps and one of the

Division's combat leaders on Guadalcanal, was elected president of the Association. Col Raymond G. Davis was elected vice president; LtCol Warren Sivertsen, 2d Vice President; Henry C. Poppell, 3d Vice President; Col George E. Bowdoin, 4th Vice President; CWO Levi Woodbury, Secretary; Maj Ralph Marston, Legal Officer; TSgt Thomas Travis, Sergeant-at-arms and Father James J. Fitzgerald, Chaplain.

Activities of the reunion were highlighted by a parade to the Commons where memorial services were held.

At the Commons ceremony, Gen G. C. Thomas administered the oath to 80 new recruits who were sworn in to the Corps as the "Vandegrift Platoon."

Col L. W. Walt was featured speaker at the services and after the ceremony, the drum and bugle corps and the drill team from the Marine Barracks, D. C., performed.

On the social side was a band concert, various unit reunions, a "Down Under Party" and the banquet-entertainment-dance at the Armory.

At the meeting it was announced that the 1959, East Coast reunion will be held in Detroit. USMC

# The Marine Corps Association



*The purposes for which the Association is formed are to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among the members, and to provide for their professional advancement; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; to increase the efficiency thereof; and to further the interests of the military and naval services in all ways not inconsistent with the good of the general Government.*



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